Essays in labour economics by POSCH, Johanna Laurentia
  
Essays in Labour Economics 
 
Johanna Posch 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of 
Doctor of Economics of the European University Institute 
Florence, 21 February 2019 

 
European University Institute 
Department of Economics 
Essays in Labour Economics 
 
Johanna Posch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of 
Doctor of Economics of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Prof. Andrea Ichino, EUI, Supervisor 
Prof. Andrea Mattozzi, EUI 
Prof. Andreas Steinhauer, The University of Edinburgh 
Prof. Josef Zweimüller, University of Zurich 
 
© Johanna Posch, 2019 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior 
permission of the author 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher declaration to accompany the submission of written work  
 
 
I, Johanna Posch certify that I am the author of the work “Essays in Labour Economics” I 
have presented for examination for the PhD thesis at the European University Institute.  I 
also certify that this is solely my own original work, other than where I have clearly 
indicated, in this declaration and in the thesis, that it is the work of others. 
 
I warrant that I have obtained all the permissions required for using any material from 
other copyrighted publications. 
 
I certify that this work complies with the Code of Ethics in Academic Research issued by the 
European University Institute (IUE 332/2/10 (CA 297). 
 
The copyright of this work rests with its author. [quotation from it is permitted, provided 
that full acknowledgement is made.] This work may not be reproduced without my prior 
written consent. This authorisation does not, to the best of my knowledge, infringe the 
rights of any third party. 
 
 
Statement of inclusion of previous work (if applicable): 
 
I confirm that chapter 3 was jointly co-authored with Mr. Tito Boeri, Mr. Andrea Ichino, Mr. Enrico 
Moretti and I contributed 25% of the work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signature and Date: 
 
 
 
15.11.2018 
 
Abstract
The elderly are an ever-growing group of the population of western countries. Increasing
their low employment rates is one of the greatest challenges we face in labour market
policy today and is the subject of the first chapter of this thesis. I evaluate the labour
market effects of partial retirement - that is a scheme that subsidises part-time work for
older workers. It was introduced as an attempt to extend working lives by incentivising
part-time employment after a certain age. I find that this policy had overwhelmingly
negative effects on old-age labour supply as most workers substituted full-time work with
part-time work in partial retirement without actually extending their active lives.
Chapter 2 of this thesis is a reflection on the labour market situation of young workers
with parental backgrounds that make it difficult for them to achieve their potential. When
and where they are held back and whether an open labour market can compensate for
this disadvantage is the subject of this chapter. I find that after entering the labour force,
workers from disadvantaged backgrounds ”catch-up” in terms of wages with respect to
their privileged peers with the same educational achievement. I explain this phenomenon
in a setup of education signalling with noise and subsequent employer learning.
In the third chapter my co-authors and I focus on the consequences of national wage
setting mechanisms in countries with large geographic differences in labour productivity.
We confront Germany with relatively flexible wage bargaining mechanisms and Italy with
very rigid ones. We find that given the large productivity differences in both countries,
Italy’s highly centralised bargaining system generates significant inefficiencies and high
costs in terms of aggregate earnings and employment particularly in the South.
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Preface
What I present here are three chapters in labour economics that differ in their focus,
method and implications for labour market policy. What connects them is perhaps that
they provide insights into the labour market realities of three groups of workers that have
somewhat particular policy needs and experiences. The first group is the elderly. They
are a growing share of the population of western countries, leading to both social change
and a significant burden to welfare states. Their continued inclusion in the work force
is arguably one of the greatest challenges we face in labour market policy today, and
is the subject of the first chapter. The second group are young workers with parental
backgrounds that make it difficult for them to achieve their potential. When and where
they are held back and whether an open labour market can compensate for this is the
subject of the second chapter. The third group are workers living in structurally weak
and unproduductive geographic regions. To what extent labour market institutions like
collective bargaining can be helpful or harmful to their economic success is the subject
of the third chapter.
The first chapter of this thesis deals with the effects of a policy meant to encourage part-
time work among older workers. It allows workers to reduce working hours to part-time
after reaching a certain age - and thus retire ”partially”. At the same time workers draw
a benefit that can be interpreted as a partial pension, that complements their income to
ensure a smooth transition into full retirement. This programme seeks to extend working
lives through a reduction of working hours at older ages using pensions or subsidies to
compensate for at least part of the loss in earnings. In chapter 1, I evaluate the em-
ployment effects of partial retirement using the quasi-experimental variation of a policy
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reform in Austria. The 2004 reform of the partial retirement scheme in Austria and the
corresponding cut-off at the eligibility age allow me to estimate its causal effect using a
regression discontinuity design on the birthdate of individual workers. I find that subsi-
dising partial retirement - in the Austrian context - had an overall large negative effect
on employment in terms of hours. This indicates that most workers substituted full-time
work with part-time work in partial retirement. I estimate that only 15% of the days old
workers spent in part-time work due to the policy can be attributed to days otherwise
spent in non-employment for the population overall. Some heterogeneity analysis reveals
however, that employment effects are significantly more positive for the part of the popu-
lation who - due to their characteristics - has a high risk of withdrawing from the labour
force before the official retirement age. For this group I find that the availability of partial
retirement reduces in particular the uptake of disability insurance. This indicates that
the part-time policy could increase its effectiveness by focussing on individuals who have
or are at risk of developing a disability. I also provide some evidence with respect to
spillover effects of partial retirement on the firm level, that is its impact on both hiring
of new workers as well as retention of existing ones. I find that partial retirees tend to
be replaced by newly hired workers into the firm relatively quickly. Other co-workers do
not seem to be affected by the policy.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I argue that children of parents with low educational achieve-
ment face an additional - unobserved - cost of investing in signals like education. There-
fore, they obtain less education than their counterparts from a more educated family even
if they have the same innate abilities. If this is the case, then out of a group of people with
the same educational achievement those from less privileged background have a higher
innate ability. Then, upon entry in the labour market that rewards this ability, they
will have a steeper wage growth than individuals from a ”better” parental background
who invested in the same signals. I find empirical support for the implications of this
hypothesis in a setup of employer learning with statistical discrimination using data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel.
In Chapter 3 my co-authors and I study the local and aggregate effects of national wage
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bargaining systems. In many European countries, wages are determined by collective
bargaining agreements. These agreements are intended to improve wages and reduce
inequality. We study the local and aggregate effects of two versions of collective bar-
gaining systems: Italy and Germany. Italy sets wages based on nationwide contracts
that allow for limited local wage adjustments, while Germany has moved toward a more
flexible system that allows for local bargaining. We show that while the Italian system
is successful at reducing nominal wage inequality, it also creates costly geographic imbal-
ances due to geographic differences in firm productivity. We show that the North-South
productivity gap in Italy similar to the West-East productivity gap in Germany. As
a result of their different collective bargaining systems, Italy exhibits almost no rela-
tionship between local productivity and local nominal wages, while Germany has larger
geographic wage differences and a tighter link between local wages and local productivity.
In Italy, low productivity provinces have significantly higher non-employment rates than
high productivity provinces, because employers cannot lower wages, while in Germany
the relationship between non-employment and productivity is weaker. In Italy, the rela-
tionship between real wages and productivity is negative, with lower real wages in the
North compared to the South, since the latter has low housing costs but similar nominal
wages. Thus, conditional on having a job, Italian workers have higher purchasing power
in the South, but the probability of having a job is higher in the North. We conclude
that the Italian system has significant costs in terms of forgone aggregate earnings and
employment because it generates a spatial equilibrium where workers queue for jobs in
the South and remain unemployed while waiting. If Italy adopted the German system,
we estimate that aggregate employment and earnings could increase by 12%, and 7% ,
respectively. Our findings are relevant for several other European countries with systems
similar to Italy’s.
3
Chapter 1
Can Partial Retirement Increase
Old-Age Employment?
Evidence from Austria
1.1 Introduction
Aging populations and low labour force participation among the elderly is creating an
ever increasing share of the population that does not work. This is a strain for welfare
states, where retirement expenditures constitute a large share of public spending espe-
cially in European countries. It is also a social issue in societies where work is at the core
of social interaction and identity. Against this background, finding new ways of labour
market integration for the elderly is arguably one of the greatest challenges we face in
labour market policy today.
In recent years there has thus been increasing pressure on governments and social security
systems to address these issues. Many countries have raised or are planning to raise the
normal retirement age, abolish early retirement options and have implemented special
programmes to help the elderly unemployed to reintegrate in the labour market.
As a part of this reform process, some countries have also experimented with policies
meant to encourage part-time work among older workers. These ”partial retirement”
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policies are the focus of this paper. They allow workers to reduce working hours to
part-time after reaching a certain age - and thus retire ”partially”. At the same time
workers draw a benefit that can be interpreted as a partial pension, that complements
their income to ensure a smooth transition into full retirement. This type of programme
seeks to extend working lives through a reduction of working hours at older ages using
pensions or subsidies to compensate for at least part of the loss in earnings.
Austria introduced partial retirement in 2000 and will be the empirical setting of this pa-
per. However, similar schemes are (or have been) in place in several countries including
Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands.
Despite its popularity, we yet lack quasi-experimental evidence on the effects of partial
retirement on the labour supply of older workers.
From an economic theory perspective it is not ex-ante clear what the employment effects
of such programmes will be. In the absence of part time options, any population of elderly
workers will consist of two groups: the ones that choose to still work full-time and the
ones that stop working altogether. Whether an increase in part-time work among the
elderly increases or decreases total labour supply ultimately depends on how it affects
the composition of these two groups.
In this paper, I evaluate the employment effects of partial retirement using the quasi-
experimental variation of a policy reform in Austria. The 2004 reform of the partial
retirement scheme in Austria and the corresponding cut-off at the eligibility age allow me
to estimate its causal effect using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) on the birth-
date of individual workers. I find that subsidising partial retirement - in the Austrian
context - had an overall large negative effect on employment in terms of hours. This
indicates that most workers substituted full-time work with part-time work in partial
retirement. I estimate that of only 15% of the days old workers spent in part-time work
due to the policy can be attributed to days otherwise spent in non-employment over a
ten year horizon for the population overall. Some heterogeneity analysis reveals however,
that positive employment effects are significantly larger for the part of the population
who - due to their characteristics - has a high risk of withdrawing from the labour force
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before the official retirement age. For this group I find that the availability of partial
retirement reduces in particular the uptake of disability insurance. This indicates that
the part-time policy could increase its effectiveness by focussing on individuals who have
or are at risk of developing a disability.
A second argument often put forward in support of part-time schemes for the elderly is
that they encourage a ”phasing-in” of younger replacement workers and are thus good
for business and for young job seekers. Others argue that in times of low demand older
workers are often the first affected by redundancies and generous social security provi-
sions are merely an attractive tool for these job cuts, without benefiting other workers
at all (Hutchens (1999)). In this paper, I will also provide some evidence with respect to
these spillover effects of partial retirement on the firm level, that is its impact on both
hiring of new workers as well as retention of existing ones. In terms of spillovers to other
workers in the same firm, I find that partial retirements do seem to cause replacements
and therefore increase hirings in the firms that send their workers to partial retirement.
I find no effects on the firm’s probability to remain in business. Partial retirements also
do not seem to affect the tenure probability or wages of co-workers.
This is the first study to evaluate the effects of a partial retirement policy in the context
of a natural experiment. The advantage of the research design of this paper is that it
measures the causal effects of the policy even in the presence of selection into partial
retirement based on unobservables of either firms or workers. That being said, the liter-
ature on partial retirement so far, finds consistently negative overall employment effects.
While due to the different design of other papers in the literature, it is difficult to compare
the results quantitatively, my findings are qualitatively in line with what has been found
in other settings.
Bo¨rsch-Supan et al. (2018) find only small increases in labour force participation by the
55-64 year olds in a cross-country study of flexible retirement reforms. The negative
effects on hours in the same group are large. Graf et al. (2011), evaluate the policy in
Austria matching individuals who take vs. individuals that do not take up partial retire-
ment. They thus evaluate the treatment effect of reducing hours directly. They find small
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positive effects on days employed in the first four years after take-up, but large negative
effects on full-time equivalent employment. They also find small negative effects on the
days spent in unemployment. Huber et al. (2013) look at a partial retirement policy in
Germany that shares the key features of the Austrian policy. The study is more similar
to this one in that they evaluate an intent to treat effect of working in a firm that offers
partial retirement. They then match on both worker and firm characteristics to compare
similar workers working in similar firms some of which self-report that they offer partial
retirement and some don’t. They find in particular differences between workers in the
East and West of Germany. While in the West the policy seems to have almost no effects
on labour force participation, they find that in the East the option of partial retirement
does reduce the probability of entering retirement through unemployment. They also
look at the effect on other workers in the same firms not directly affected by partial re-
tirement. They find that the option of partial retirement for older workers has positive
spill-over effects on the employment of younger workers.
1.2 Institutional Setting
Like many other European countries, Austria has an effective retirement age that lies well
below the OECD average. In particular, workers tend to retire on average long before the
statutory retirement age, which is 60 for women and 65 for men. In 1999 the average age
at which retirement benefits were claimed among women was 58.2 (1.8 years before the
normal retirement age), among men 61.9 (3.1 years before the normal age). Here again,
Austria is not an isolated case. The effective age of labour market exit is lower than the
offical retirement age for both men and women in 13 out of 35 OECD countries (OECD
(2017)).
It is important to note that in the Austrian context along with early retirement options,
unemployment and disability benefits also play a significant role for a premature with-
drawal from the labour force. Overall in 1999, 16.5% of men and women who entered
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retirement entered through unemployment, an additional 23.2% came through some form
of disability benefits (in some cases: early retirement due to limited ability to work). In
addition, of those retiring in 1999 48.4% were early retirees (among which the share of
previously unemployed was twice as large as it was among all retirees). 1 Counteracting
this development was an important motivation for the introduction of partial retirement
in the year 2000.
Figure 1.1 gives a quick overview of the options Austrian workers at the time faced in
terms of early retirement. In the rest of this section I will describe the details of the
institutional setting regarding retirement in Austria. For an even more detailed account
of the Austrian public pension system and its evolution in the early 2000s see Staubli
and Zweimu¨ller (2013).
The Austrian social security system covers all private sector workers and provides early
retirement pensions, old age pensions, and disability pensions. These pensions provide
the main source of income in retirement. The level of benefits depends both on an average
of earnings in the highest earning 15 years of the working life as well as the insurance years
(though insurance years include periods of parental leave, unemployment and military
service). On average, the replacement rate of pensions after income and payroll taxes is
75% of the pre-retirement net earnings. The normal retirement age is 60 for women and
65 for men conditional on at least 15 insurance years in the past 30 years. The access
age to early retirement was 60 for men and 55 for women before 2000 conditional on 37.5
insurance years. In 2000, around 88% of men and 54% of women satisfied this criterion
when they reached the specified age (Staubli and Zweimu¨ller (2013)). Recipients of an
early retirement pension lose their benefit in each month that they earn above a pre-
defined threshold (around 380 euros per month). No such restrictions apply for normal
old-age pensions (after the normal retirement age). Two pension reforms enacted in 2000
and 2003 raised the minimum age for early retirement for those individuals gradually
from 55 for women and 60 for men to 60 and 65 respectively. This took place in two-
month and later monthly steps per quarter of birth. Note that these gradual changes
1Own calculations on the basis of social security registry
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affected cohorts before and after the cut-off for the partial retirement reform in the same
way and therefore is unlikely to confound the results of this paper. The reforms did not
affect men with at least 45 insurance years and women with at least 40 insurance years
who could still retire earlier if they met the requirement. It also did not affect men and
women qualifying for a special heavy labor pension for people doing hard physical work.
In 2005 an additional corridor pension was introduced which allowed retirement at 62
conditional on having 37.5 insurance years.
Disability insurance can be claimed by individuals with a health impairment that reduces
the capacity to work by more than 50% who do not qualify for any old-age pension. Be-
cause medical criteria for disability classification are relaxed starting at age 57, disability
pensions make up a large share of early withdrawals from the labour force (Staubli (2011)).
With a replacement rate of about 55% of last net earnings unemployment benefits can
be drawn for up to a year. After that year, they can be extended in a slightly reduced
version de-facto indefinitely though they are reduced by the earnings of the spouse or
other family member in the same household.
1.2.1 Partial Retirement
Partial retirement (Altersteilzeit in German) was introduced in Austria after a period
of decreasing employment of the elderly population. As mentioned above, a significant
share of elderly Austrians withdrew from the labour force prematurely claiming unem-
ployment or disability benefits or entering other forms of non-employment. The objective
of partial retirement was thus to increase attachment to the labour force in the immediate
pre-retirement period. The idea was to do this by making part-time work particularly at-
tractive and thereby incentivise working part-time relative to dropping out of the labour
market completely. The policy allowed male workers above 55 and female workers above
50 to reduce their hours to 40-60% of full-time. These workers would receive the corre-
sponding wage plus a top-up of 50% of their foregone earnings (lost through the reduction
of hours). This top-up was financed by the government. Figure 1.2 is a graphical rep-
resentation of the budget set of an elderly worker resulting from the option of partial
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retirement. Partial retirement could only be taken up in mutual agreement of employer
and employee – this means there was no legal claim to it on either side. The maximal
length of partial retirement agreements was initially set to 6 1/2 years. Although it was
later varied, a continuation until the first possible age of early retirement was always
ensured. There were two possible versions of partial retirement: On the one hand the
”phased” option which implied exactly a reduction of hours for the whole duration of the
agreement. On the other hand, there was the ”block” version that involved a full-time
and a leisure phase. So for instance a partial retirement agreement of 5 years, reducing
to 50% would imply 2.5 years full-time work and 2.5 years of leisure. In this version the
policy essentially amounted to early retirement.
1.2.2 2004 Reform
Partial retirement was fairly popular among workers and firms in the first three years.
Among the cohort reaching the eligibility age in 2001 and fulfilling basic eligibility criteria,
11.7% would enter partial retirement within one year from becoming eligible. This led to
broad criticism of the high cost of the programme. Facing pressure to reduce the scope
of the programme the Austrian government thus implemented a reform that made access
more stringent from January 1, 2004. In particular, the reform required firms to employ
substitute worker if they sent someone to partial retirement. This substitute worker had
to be employed for above 12 hours a week and had to be a previously unemployed person
or an apprentice. If they failed to do so, firms would have to pay 50% of the wage
top up themselves for the phased version and 100% for the block version2. The second
change implemented with the 2004 reform was the initiation of a step-wise increase of
the eligibility age by a half year every year between 2004 and 2009. The eligibility age
was thus raised from 50/55 in 2003 to 53 for women and 58 for men in 2009.
This reform, paired with the age required for eligibility provides my empirical set-up for
the evaluation of this policy. Individuals born so that they reached the eligibility age
2In the block version, employers had the option of hiring the substitute only during the leisure phase.
In that case, they didn’t have to pay for the top-up in the leisure phase, but still 50% of it during the
full-time phase.
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to partial retirement (50 for women, 55 for men) before January 2004 were eligible to
take up partial retirement before the reform and thus the old an less restrictive version
of the policy. Individuals reaching this age one month later, were subject to the new
restrictions introduced by the reform. For workers born just after the cut-off two things
changed therefore: First, they were allowed to enter partial retirement only a half year
later (when they were 50.5 or 55.5). Secondly, their employers had to potentially incur a
higher cost for signing the partial retirement agreement because of the subsititute worker
requirement or alternatively the increased wage load.
Uptake reacted strongly to the reform. There was a significant last-minute effect in
December 2003 followed by a sharp drop in uptake (see Figure 1.3). The last-minute
spike in take-up is driven by workers across the eligibility age range and not just by
those whose eligibility is affected by the increase in the eligibility age (see Figure 1.4 for
take-up behaviour of above 51/56 year olds). This indicates that firms considered the
substitute requirement as a significant constraint and reacted strongly to it. While this
is an interesting fact as such, for the purpose of this paper it suffices to acknowledge that
the access of workers to partial retirement was suddenly and exogenously made more
difficult. This is the fact that I will use to evaluate the policy causally.
1.3 Data and Summary Statistics
1.3.1 Austrian Social Security Database and Partial Retirement
Data
I use the Austrian Social Security Data (Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009)). These data contain
very detailed longitudinal information for all private sector workers in Austria. At the
individual level the data include gender, nationality, month and year of birth, blue-collar
or white-collar status, daily labor market history, and earnings. The data also record firm
identifiers for employers and their location and industry. I obtained additional data on
the individual take-up of partial retirement from the Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs.
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1.3.2 Sample Construction
My sample of individuals consists of women of the birth cohorts 1951-1956 and men from
1946-1951. That means all individuals born within three years of the threshold as defined
by the partial retirement reform. I restrict my attention to those in stable employment at
age 533, working in a firm with more that 3 employees. I also restrict the sample to firms
outside of seasonal industries (tourism, construction, agriculture, mining)4. Individuals
in the sample have to fulfill the criteria of eligiblity in terms of working history at the
eligibility age in principle5. This leaves a sample of 82 497 women and 95 267 men.
The firms for which I evaluate spillover effects will be the employers of those individuals
on their 53rd birthday. For the firm and peer sample I look at firms with less than 40
employees. Peers are the co-workers of critical workers in the same firm in December
2002. My final sample consists of 25 180 firms with an average of 15 co-workers per
sample individual.
1.3.3 Descriptives and Selection into Partial Retirement
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the composition of my sample by a range of characteristics.
Regardless of treatment status (pre/post reform). I also show the composition of the
takers and non-takers group. Table 1.3 shows the marginal effects of a probit model of
ever being observed in partial retirement on different variables. Men are overrepresented
in the sample and also among those taking up partial retirement. As can be seen in
Table 1.3 men are actually less likely to take up partial retirement once earnings and
employment history are controlled for. While one may think the target population of
partial retirement are those less able to work fulltime, surprisingly, having experienced
unemployment or extended sickness 6 does not increase (rather decreases) an individual’s
3Defined as working more than 300 days in the year they turn 53.
4This is because the large employment fluctuations in these industries make evaluating spillover effects
particularly difficult.
5To be eligible, workers have to have been employed at least 15 years in the past 25 years at the time
they reach the eligibility age. I restict the sample to individuals who at age 48/53 have cumulated days
of employment are such that with continuous full-time work they could reach the eligibility requirement
of 15 years
6Sickness is reported in the social security registry only when it exceeds 30 days
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probability to reduce to part-time. Among the industries, Manufacturing, Energy and
Financial services seem to employ the highest fraction of partial retirees. In general, the
population most likely to enter partial retirement are high earning, white collar workers
with very stable working arrangements (long tenure) in firms with a high general wage
level. This may already be a first indicator, that in fact those individuals who take up
partial retirement are not the ones with the least attachment to the labour force and
that the counterfactual labour market behaviour in the absence of the partial retirement
policy may in fact be continued full time employment. It is this counterfactual scenario
that I will determine in a causal framework in the next sections.
1.4 Estimation
1.4.1 Employment Effects of Partial Retirement for Elderly Work-
ers
Objective
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the employment effects of the availability
of partial retirement on the elderly workers it was designed for. I will exploit the 2004
reform combined with the eligibility age cut-off for identification. In particular, workers
who had turned 50/55 before January 2004 were still eligible to take up the old ”cheaper”
version of partial retirement, while those who did not reach the age of eligibility in time
could not. There is thus a strict cut-off in terms of month of birth of who could be in the
old system and who was eligible only to the new system. This results in a significant jump
in the take-up rate of partial retirement right at this birthmonth cut-off. I will exploit this
cut-off to implement a regression discontinuity design where the running variable is the
birthmonth of the worker. Figure 1.5 shows the jump in partial retirement uptake at this
cut-off. Since no other policy changes at this particular birthmonth cut-off, the differences
of workers close to either side of the cut-off can be causally attributed to the effect of
the easier availability of partial retirement. I will estimate the effect of easier access to
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partial retirement on days in partial retirement, days in employment, days in full-time
equivalent employment, days in unemployment, on disability and in old-age retirement.
All this on a 5 and 10 year horizon as well as in a yearly dynamic framework. I also
look at the retirement age and the age that the individual is last observed in employment
(effective retirement age).
RD Estimation Framework
I estimate an ITT effect of being born such that one was eligible to partial retirement
before the reform vs just after. Specification for individual level outcomes:
Yi = α + βTi + γ1f(bmi) + γ2Ti × f(bmi) + γ3Xi + εi
where Ti is an indicator whether the birthmonth is lower than the cut-off, meaning that
the individual was eligible to partial retirement before the reform. bmi is the month of
birth of the worker. f(bmi) is a linear trend. β is the parameter of interest in this case
and represents the ITT effect of partial retirement. It can be interpreted as the effect of
being born such that the easy access partial retirement policy was just still available. Xi
is a vector of controls including gender, white/blue collar, firm size, earnings at 48/53,
days tenure at 48/53, working history of the last 10 years before turning 48/53 (sick
days, days unemployed). The optimal bandwidth is estimated following the methodology
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014b) and Calonico et al. (2014a), though results are robust
to the use of a predetermined bandwidth of 12 months. Standard errors are clustered
on the firm level. In Table 1.4 I show the balancing results of running this specification
on the predetermined outcomes later used as controls (gender, white/blue collar, firm
size, earnings at 48/53, days tenure at 48/53, working history of the last 10 years before
turning 48/53 (sick days, days unemployed) and the wage level in the firm).
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1.4.2 Spill-over Effects of Partial Retirement on Firms’ Employ-
ment Behaviour and Peer Effects
Objective
While the objective of partial retirement was primarily an increase in the labour force
attachment of the elderly workers themselves, it is also often argued that this kind of
phasing out of the workforce may facilitate a slow phasing in of new younger workers in
their place. Given my treatment variation on an individual level I have the opportunity
to test also this proposition. By looking at firms employing treated or non-treated work-
ers, I extend the treatment status to firm level. In my empirical setting, I have a strong
sudden shock to partial retirement uptake in December 2003 for individuals born before
the cut-off. This allows me to look at the causal effect of a worker going into partial
retirement on both the hiring of new workers by the firm as well as the retention rate
and wages of already employed peers at the firm.7
It should be noted that the firm and peer level outcomes does not come without caveat:
First, because the reform in 2004 influenced the way in which partial retirement work-
ers had to be substituted directly, the treatment assignment may itself influence hiring
behaviour. Untreated - post-reform individuals - are less likely to enter partial retire-
ment but if they do enter they may be more likely to be substituted. This concern is
alleviated by the fact that the untreated, born such that they couldn’t take up partial
retirement pre-reform, were also affected by an increase in the eligibility age by half a
year. Therefore the earliest possible time when any untreated individual could take up
partial retirement with substitution requirement is in July 2004. Any hirings before that
can thus be attributed to the spike in partial retirements pre-reform.
The second concern would be that if untreated individuals are indeed more likely to leave
the labour force early than pre-reform individuals - that is, if partial retirement indeed
has positive effects of employment - then this could have its own effect on hirings and thus
dampen any effect we see on substitute hirings of partial retirement takers. Ex-post this
7Peers may be affected by a sudden loss of a worker because market frictions prevent an immediate
substitution with a newly hired worker (Ja¨ger (2016)).
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seems to be less of an issue as the actual effects on non-employment I find are very small.
It is nevertheless noted that all estimated spillover effects may be downward biased.
RD Estimation Framework
The obvious challenge with my estimation framework is that individual workers are
treated, but I want to look at outcomes on the firm level. For that purpose, I restrict my
sample to firms who employ at least one worker who has been born somewhere within
the selected bandwidth around the cut-off. For the purpose of this description I will call
such a worker ”critical worker”. This worker will be either ”treated” (born such that
she had access to the old system of partial retirement) or not treated. Some firms will
employ only one ”critical worker”. In this case the firm is unequivocally treated or not.
For firms with more than one such worker it is less clear. I construct my dataset in a
way that I will have one observation for every pair of critical worker and firm. Thus, if a
firm has two critical workers, its outcome will be recorded twice in my dataset with the
corresponding treatment assignment of each of the critical workers. I will then weight the
observation of firms by the inverse of the number of critical workers. The coefficient of
the treatment variable can thus be interpreted as the contribution of one treated worker
compared to a non-treated worker to the firms’ hiring outcomes. For the outcomes of
peer workers, I employ the same strategy except that this time there is one observation
for each peer-critical worker pair. The regression is then weighted by the inverse of the
number of peers in a firm × critical workers. Otherwise the specification is identical
to the one for individual level outcomes. To be able to detect spill-overs, I restrict my
sample to firms with less than 40 employees in December 2002 for the spill-over analysis.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Elderly Workers
I study the ITT effects of availability of partial retirement on elderly workers’ days in
partial retirement, days in employment, days in full-time employment, days in unem-
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ployment, on disability and in old-age retirement. I also look at the retirement age (first
observed old-age pension), the age that the individual is last observed in employment
(effective retirement age). The last two outcomes are shown in Table 1.5. Table 1.6
reports the effects on the probability of experiencing a certain state of employment or
non-employment over a 5 year horizon after reaching age 50 for women and 55 for men.
Table 1.7 looks at the total days in employment and different forms non-employement
over the five years. Tables 1.8, 1.9 do the same thing for a horizon of 10 years after
turning 50/55. In columns (2) and (4) of each table I have added controls for gender,
white/blue collar, firm size, earnings at 48/53, days tenure at 48/53, working history of
the last 10 years before turning 48/53 (sick days, days unemployed). Treated individuals
are the ones born before the cut-off and thus had easier access to partial retirement.
Overall, being born on the left of the threshold (treated) increases the probability of tak-
ing up partial retirement consistently by 10 percentage points. Neither the official, nor
the effective retirement age are significantly affected by this increase in the take-up of par-
tial retirement. It does however decrease the probability of ever being out of employment
by 2.3%8 and decreases the probability of experiencing unemployment and disability by
about 1.6 percentage points each over a horizon of five years. The unemployment effect
is not significant at a 10 year horizon. Table 1.7 shows that the 10 pp increase in the
probability of take-up translate into 224 days more in partial retirement over 5 years, 277
over 10 years. As we will see in the dynamic estimation (Figures 1.6 and 1.7) the small
difference between 10 and 5 year results is due to a decrease in the effect on days spent
in partial retirement after year 5 from the eligibility age.
The additional days spent in partial retirement by the treated group can be split quite
precisely into days that were worked full time (in employment but not partial retirement)
by the counterfactual (non-treated) group and days that were instead spent not employed.
These numbers mark the fundamental trade-off of this policy: Some people will use the
subsidised part-time work to extend their working lives and increase attachment to the
labour force when they would have otherwise dropped out. Some will use the subsidy on
8I will always cite the numbers of the preferred specification with controls here.
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part-time to reduce hours earlier than they would have done incurring a smaller income
loss.
My results indicate that the shares of the former are small while there is ample evidence
for the latter behaviour. Among the average number of additional days the treatment
group spent in partial retirement with respect to the control group in my preferred speci-
fication with controls, almost 92% are spent in full time employment by the control group
over a 5 year horizon (this can be seen in Panel A, column 4 of Table 1.7). There is only a
very small decrease of days spent out of employment of the treated group. It is only over
the 10 year horizon in the specification with controls that we can reject the change in
days spent not employed to be zero at a 10% significance level. The number of days spent
in unemployment and disability are not statistically distinguishable from zero over the 5
year horizon. Over the 10 year horizon the number of days spent in disability decreases
slightly. This means that despite the fact that partial retirement reduces the probability
of experiencing a spell of unemployment or going on disability slightly, quantitatively
these spells are small especially when compared to the large reductions in full-time work.
It can thus be said that overall, the effects of partial retirement on elderly employment
are overwhelmingly negative.
Nevertheless, to study a bit more in detail what is going on and when, the results of an
event-study type dynamic specification are shown in Figures 1.6 and 1.7. These figures
show the ITT estimates for each year (measured in age from 50/55). We can clearly
see the strong impact of the birthmonth cut-off on the take-up of partial retirement at
the eligibility age (Panel a) Figure 1.6) that disappears after around year 8 (age 58/63).
Panel c) shows the impact on full-time employment, that almost mirrors Panel a). Here
however, we also see that the effect on the extensive margin (days out of employment) is
not consistently zero. Especially in years 4-6 after reaching the eligibility age, individuals
with better access to partial retirement tend to be employed for more days than their
untreated counterparts. These effects vanish once age 62 is reached for men and 57 for
women. These are the ages where early retirement becomes available (for women it starts
from 57 and 9 months of age). This is consistent with the idea that partial retirement
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may keep employment intact as long as the outside option is unemployment, disability or
other forms of non-employment. Once early retirement becomes available, partial retirees
transition to that at the same rate as people with no access to partial retirement. This
version of events is also supported by Figure 1.7. While the days in retirement are not
significantly different between the two groups at any point (we could expect an effect
starting from year 7 after eligibility in panel c), partial retirement does seem to decrease
the amount of days spent in disability insurance (particularly after period 2 of panel a,
which is when men reach the age of easy access to disability). Even though there seem to
be some small positive employment effects of partial retirement at some ages, it does not
compensate for the large negative ones that come through the reduction of hours. This
is clear from panel c in Figure 1.6.
Individuals with High Propensity to Retire Early
Earlier in this paper, I have highlighted that the net employment effects of a policy like
partial retirement depend on the counterfactual labour supply of the people drawn to
partial retirement. The ideal part-time policy helps individuals to stay attached to the
labour market when they are not able or willing to work full-time anymore. These people
would - in the absence of partial retirement - prematurely withdraw from the labour
force completely. The results presented in section 1.5.1 are indicative that this is not the
kind of person primarily attracted to partial retirement. It seems that an overwhelming
majority of people who choose to take up the part-time scheme would have otherwise
continued to work full-time. This raises the question whether there are positive labour
supply effects of the policy on people with low labour force attachment that are overshad-
owed by the large-scale take-up of people who are really at no risk to stop working before
formal retirement. If this were the case then doing a better job at targeting the policy
to people with low attachment might significantly improve the effectiveness of partial
retirement at increasing old-age labour supply.
To assess this possibility, I repeat the analysis above for those individuals in the originial
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sample that I identify as having a high propensity for early effective retirement. I iden-
tify ”high risk” people in my sample by looking at the characteristics of early retirees of
earlier cohorts, not exposed to partial retirement. In particular I use a sample of 125 605
individuals from the cohorts of 1930 to 1934 (men) and 1935 to 1939 women, selected
in the exact same way as the original sample with respect to their working history etc.9
These people have reached the normal retirement age before partial retirement was in-
troduced and are thus unaffected by the policy. I define early effective retirement in this
setting as a withdrawal from the labour force (last employment spell) more than three
months before reaching the earliest legal pension age (the ERA at the time was 55 for
women and 60 for men). I run a linear regression of an indicator of whether the individual
is an early effective retiree on some baseline characteristics (Gender, white/blue collar
status and log earnings age 48/53, log firm size, log tenure at the firm, dummies for ever
having experienced unemployment or extended sickness in the past 10 years, Industry).
I then use these coefficients and the same characteristics to predict the ”risk” of early
effective retirement of the original sample. I classify ”high risk” individuals above median
predicted probability of early labour force withdrawal. Tables 1.10 and 1.11 show the
characteristics of the ”high risk” vs. the low risk in the original sample. Most notably,
the high risk sample consists predominantly of men and blue collar workers. Many of
them have experienced unemployment or extended sickness in the past. The dominant
industries are manufacturing and retail. Tables 1.12 and 1.13 show the labour market
effects focussing exclusively on these ”high risk” individuals of the original sample. Table
1.12 shows the effects on the retirement age of this group, while Table 1.13 shows the
effects on labour market status over a ten year horizon.
Comparing the results in Table 1.13 to those in Table 1.9 discussed in section 1.5.1,
one can see that indeed the positive participation effects of partial retirement are more
pronounced focussing on this group of individuals with low predicted labour market at-
9This means that they are in stable employment at age 53, working in a firm with more that 3
employees, outside of seasonal industries and fulfill the criteria of eligiblity in terms of working history
for partial retirement in principle. The only difference being that because employment spells are recorded
only from 1972 onwards, I cannot observe a working history of 25 years, so I use individuals having worked
60% of the 10 years before reaching age 48/53.
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tachment. While the effects on the take-up of partial retirement are very similar to those
of the entire sample (282 over 10 years), the number of days spent out of employment
are reduced much more for the treated of this group. The days spent out of employment
are reduced by 80 days in the preferred specification over 10 years. This corresponds
to 28% of the additional partial retirement days, amost twice as large as for the entire
sample where this percentage was only 15%.10 Most of this positive employment effect is
caused by a reduction of the days spent in disability. The days spent in disability of the
treated group is reduced by about 14% relative to the already high mean over 10 years of
the control group of the ”high risk” sample. This percentage is below 10 for the general
sample. The effective retirement age for the high risk sample is significantly increased by
about 2 months on average.
The take-away from this exercise should be that effective targeting can improve the ef-
fectiveness of part-time policies significantly. While we have seen that they are attractive
to a lot of different workers - many of whom are at a low risk to exit the labour force
prematurely - part-time can have positive employment effects acting as an alternative for
instance to disability insurance.
1.5.2 Spill-over Effects
As mentioned earlier, it is also interesting in this setting to look at the reaction of the
employer to partial retirement. In my empirical setting, I have a strong sudden shock
to partial retirement uptake in December 2003 for individuals born before the cut-off.
Looking at the employer of these individuals11 Figure 1.8, panel a) shows the monthly
treatment effects on total hires around this date. Despite the relatively large standard
errors, we see an increase in the hiring of treated firms in months 0-2 after the reform-
induced spike in partial retirements. This suggests that replacement workers are hired to
replace some of the labour lost through the retirements. The exact amount of labour that
10In fact, when I look at the other half of the sample, having only low risk of premature exit of the
labour force, the relation of the increase of the days spent in partial retirement and decrease in full-time
employment days is almost one-to-one. This means that among this group, partial retirement caused
almost exclusively a reduction in full-time work, with no positive effects on the extensive margin.
11For a detailed explanation on how I translate individual level treatment to firm or peer level outcomes
please refer to the methodology section of this paper.
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is being replaced is difficult to pinpoint because of the imprecise estimates. However, if
we take the point estimates in Figure 1.8 seriously then we have an increase in hires in
treated firm of about .1 in the first 2 months after the reform (a little less but still sizable
in month 3). If we consider that treated individuals at the cut-off are about 17% more
likely to enter partial retirement in a window of 3 months prior to the reform, then it
looks like full replacement is achieved aleady within 2 months after the spike in take-up.
There seems to be no effect of partial retirement on the probability of a firm to remain
in business.
Figure 1.9 shows the monthly effect of peers’ outcomes. If workers going on partial re-
tirement were not easily replaced but their specific human capital valuable to the firm,
we would expect the treatment effect on peers’ employment and wages to be positive
right after the reform. None of these things seem to be the case. Co-workers seem to be
rather unaffected by the partial retirement of their elderly colleagues. In part this may
of course be due to the fact that retirements can be planned long in advance. Therefore
replacements (seen in the increase in hires) can be arranged in advance. This explains the
contrast to Ja¨ger (2016) who finds spillovers to co-workers in the case of the unexpected
death of a worker.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper estimates the effects of a policy that allows ”partial” retirement through a sub-
sidised part-time scheme for elderly workers. The policy was implemented in the Austrian
context of the 2000s where older workers tended to retire prematurely through various
forms of non-employment. Partial retirement was an attempt to make employment more
attractive to those individuals. I show that in the Austrian context the policy attracted
considerably more people from full-time work into partial retirement than those who
would have otherwise not been employed. To be precise, only 8% of the increase in days
spent in partial retirement can be attributed to days otherwise spent in non-employment
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over a five year horizon. Over a ten year horizon it is only slightly more at 15%. This
means that in the Austrian setting partial retirement had overall strong negative effects
on labour supply. I do however find more positive employment effects among individuals
with characteristics associated with a high risk of early retirement. This suggests that
more effective targeting (for instance as a part of the disability insurance scheme) could
improve the effectiveness of part-time policies significantly.
I also evaluate spill-overs of partial retirement to other labour market participants. I find
that the policy increased hirings in the firms that sent workers to partial retirement and
that elderly workers were in fact replaced quite quickly. I do not find any effects in terms
of earnings or tenure for their co-workers in the same firms.
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Appendix: Tables
Table 1.1: Summary statistics and selection into partial retirement
Ever Partial retirement
Row % Column %
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Gender
Men 77,36 22,64 100,00 52,46 57,87 53,59
Women 80,97 19,03 100,00 47,54 42,13 46,41
Total 79,03 20,97 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Blue/White collar
Blue collar 82,89 17,11 100,00 41,62 32,40 39,69
White collar 76,50 23,50 100,00 58,38 67,60 60,31
Total 79,03 20,97 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Monthly earnings
0 - 1300 94,87 5,13 100,00 12,23 2,49 10,19
1300 - 1999 84,41 15,59 100,00 26,09 18,17 24,43
2000-2999 76,26 23,74 100,00 32,25 37,84 33,43
≥ 3000 72,78 27,22 100,00 29,43 41,50 31,96
Total 79,03 20,97 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Tenure at firm
less than 1 year 83,94 16,06 100,00 7,20 5,19 6,78
1-5 years 82,31 17,69 100,00 20,93 16,96 20,10
5-10 years 81,08 18,92 100,00 19,43 17,09 18,94
over 10 years 76,49 23,51 100,00 52,44 60,76 54,18
Total 79,03 20,97 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Has been sick last 10 yr
No 77,89 22,11 100,00 77,18 82,60 78,32
Yes 83,18 16,82 100,00 22,82 17,40 21,68
Total 79,03 20,97 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Has been unemployed last 10 yr
No 77,06 22,94 100,00 75,61 84,83 77,54
Yes 85,84 14,16 100,00 24,39 15,17 22,46
Total 79,03 20,97 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Note: This table describes the composition of the total sample of 177,764 individuals.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics and selection into partial retirement
Ever Partial retirement
Row % Column %
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Firm size
4 - 40 83,88 16,12 100,00 26,26 19,02 24,75
40-199 79,51 20,49 100,00 25,35 24,64 25,20
200-999 74,91 25,09 100,00 26,00 32,84 27,44
≥ 1000 78,21 21,79 100,00 22,38 23,50 22,62
Total 79,03 20,97 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Industry
Manufacturing 73,41 26,59 100,00 26,61 36,34 28,65
Energy 55,49 44,51 100,00 1,33 4,03 1,90
Water and Sewage 77,78 22,22 100,00 0,51 0,55 0,52
Retail 82,02 17,98 100,00 17,78 14,70 17,14
Transportation 87,74 12,26 100,00 6,04 3,18 5,44
Information and Communication 80,90 19,10 100,00 1,62 1,45 1,59
Finance and Insurance 72,77 27,23 100,00 6,40 9,03 6,95
Real estate 89,18 10,82 100,00 2,01 0,92 1,78
Scientific and Technical Services 76,19 23,81 100,00 3,87 4,56 4,01
Other economic services 90,58 9,42 100,00 3,22 1,26 2,81
Public Administration, Defense 84,76 15,24 100,00 19,24 13,04 17,94
Education 87,66 12,34 100,00 1,22 0,65 1,10
Health and Social services 78,03 21,97 100,00 6,18 6,56 6,26
Art, Entertainment, Recreation 88,46 11,54 100,00 0,82 0,41 0,74
Other 78,03 21,97 100,00 3,14 3,34 3,18
Total 79,03 20,97 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Region
Burgenland 77,21 22,79 100,00 2,15 2,39 2,20
Kaernten 81,52 18,48 100,00 5,38 4,60 5,21
Niederoesterreich 74,61 25,39 100,00 14,44 18,53 15,30
Oberoesterreich 70,25 29,75 100,00 15,45 24,67 17,38
Salzburg 81,50 18,50 100,00 7,14 6,11 6,93
Steiermark 81,86 18,14 100,00 12,75 10,65 12,31
Tirol 84,31 15,69 100,00 6,61 4,64 6,19
Vorarlberg 84,02 15,98 100,00 4,69 3,36 4,41
Wien 82,22 17,78 100,00 29,53 24,07 28,39
Unknown 87,66 12,34 100,00 1,85 0,98 1,67
Total 79,03 20,97 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Note: This table describes the composition of the total sample of 177,764 individuals.
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Table 1.3: Selection into partial retirement - Probit model
(1)
Woman 0.0209*** (0.00425)
White collar 0.0425*** (0.00802)
Log yearly earnings 0.0657*** (0.00328)
Log tenure in firm 0.00541** (0.00169)
Has been sick last 10 yr -0.00893* (0.00357)
Has been unemployed last 10 yr -0.0310*** (0.00375)
Log firm size 0.00424 (0.00331)
Avg wage in firm 2002 0.00177*** (0.000229)
Industry
—Manufacturing 0 (.)
—Energy 0.0887 (0.0472)
—Water and Sewage -0.0237 (0.0331)
—Retail -0.0463*** (0.00844)
—Transportation -0.103*** (0.0174)
—Information and Communication -0.0919*** (0.0271)
—Finance and Insurance -0.0356* (0.0149)
—Real estate -0.115*** (0.0183)
—Scientific and Technical Services -0.0408 (0.0211)
—Other economic services -0.0925*** (0.0134)
—Public Administration, Defense -0.0910*** (0.0179)
—Education -0.113*** (0.0307)
—Health and Social services -0.00998 (0.0125)
—Art, Entertainment, Recreation -0.117*** (0.0195)
—Other -0.00260 (0.0169)
Region
—Burgenland 0 (.)
—Kaernten -0.0595* (0.0250)
—Niederoesterreich 0.0197 (0.0222)
—Oberoesterreich 0.0517* (0.0218)
—Salzburg -0.0540** (0.0204)
—Steiermark -0.0607* (0.0258)
—Tirol -0.0867*** (0.0227)
—Vorarlberg -0.100*** (0.0219)
—Wien -0.0862*** (0.0210)
—Unknown -0.0704* (0.0304)
Observations 177764
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Table 1.4: Individuals’ pre-treatment balancing regressions
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Woman White collar Log yearly earnings Log tenure in firm
RD Estimate -0.012 -0.010 0.004 0.056
[0.015] [0.017] [0.015] [0.035]
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sick last 10 yr Unemployed last 10 yr Log firm size Avg wage in firm 2002
RD Estimate 0.006 -0.004 -0.043 0.279
[0.011] [0.010] [0.183] [0.828]
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Note: This table contains the the ITT estimates of outcomes measured pre-treatment of being born such that pre-reform
policy was available. The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated following the
methodology proposed by Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b), though results are robust to the use of a
predetermined bandwidth of 12 months.
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Table 1.5: ITT effect, individuals’ effect on age at retirement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retirement age Retirement age Age last employed Age last employed
RD Estimate 0.083 0.015 0.094 0.074
[0.081] [0.064] [0.070] [0.069]
Mean control group 60.386 60.386 58.709 58.709
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: Age at retirement is measured in distance from the normal retirement age (60 for women, 65 for men). This table
contains the the ITT estimates on retirement age of being born such that pre-reform policy was available for individuals’
outcomes of the linear RDD framework as described in section 1.4.1. The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors
(in parentheses) are calculated following the methodology proposed by Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b),
though results are robust to the use of a predetermined bandwidth of 12 months. Controls include gender, white/blue
collar, firm size, earnings at 48/53, days tenure at 48/53, working history of the last 10 years before turning 48/53 (sick
days, days unemployed).
30
Table 1.6: ITT effect, individuals’ cumulative outcomes over 5 years
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ever in partial ret Ever in partial ret Ever not employed Ever not employed
RD Estimate 0.102*** 0.102*** -0.021* -0.023**
[0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010]
Mean control group 0.136 0.136 0.328 0.328
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ever in disability Ever in disability Ever unemployed Ever unemployed
RD Estimate -0.013* -0.016** -0.016 -0.016*
[0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.009]
Mean control group 0.118 0.118 0.173 0.173
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: This table contains the the ITT estimates of outcomes cumulated over 5 years (measured in age from 50/55) of
being born such that pre-reform policy was available for individuals’ outcomes of the linear RDD framework as described in
section 1.4.1. The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated following the methodology
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b), though results are robust to the use of a predetermined
bandwidth of 12 months. Controls include gender, white/blue collar, firm size, earnings at 48/53, days tenure at 48/53,
working history of the last 10 years before turning 48/53 (sick days, days unemployed).
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Table 1.7: ITT effect, individuals’ cumulative outcomes over 5 years
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days in partial ret Days in partial ret Days in full-time Days in full-time
RD Estimate 223.109*** 224.256*** -210.416*** -205.136***
[16.375] [15.937] [21.135] [19.038]
Mean control group 103.346 103.346 1467.070 1467.070
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days not employed Days not employed Days unemployed Days unemployed
RD Estimate -12.141 -17.351 -3.148 -3.641
[13.063] [12.361] [5.386] [4.912]
Mean control group 255.830 255.830 67.961 67.961
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
PANEL C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days in disability Days in disability Days retirement Days retirement
RD Estimate -5.215 -9.063 -1.352 -1.751
[7.715] [7.627] [5.894] [5.589]
Mean control group 103.534 103.534 13.240 13.240
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: This table contains the the ITT estimates of outcomes cumulated over 5 years (measured in age from 50/55) of
being born such that pre-reform policy was available for individuals’ outcomes of the linear RDD framework as described in
section 1.4.1. The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated following the methodology
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b), though results are robust to the use of a predetermined
bandwidth of 12 months. Controls include gender, white/blue collar, firm size, earnings at 48/53, days tenure at 48/53,
working history of the last 10 years before turning 48/53 (sick days, days unemployed).
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Table 1.8: ITT effect, individuals’ cumulative outcomes over 10 years
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ever in partial ret Ever in partial ret Ever not employed Ever not employed
RD Estimate 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.001 -0.003
[0.013] [0.013] [0.008] [0.008]
Mean control group 0.165 0.165 0.888 0.888
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ever in disability Ever in disability Ever unemployed Ever unemployed
RD Estimate -0.012 -0.016** -0.004 -0.005
[0.008] [0.008] [0.013] [0.011]
Mean control group 0.152 0.152 0.215 0.215
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: This table contains the the ITT estimates of outcomes cumulated over 10 years (measured in age from 50/55) of
being born such that pre-reform policy was available for individuals’ outcomes of the linear RDD framework as described in
section 1.4.1. The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated following the methodology
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b), though results are robust to the use of a predetermined
bandwidth of 12 months. Controls include gender, white/blue collar, firm size, earnings at 48/53, days tenure at 48/53,
working history of the last 10 years before turning 48/53 (sick days, days unemployed).
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Table 1.9: ITT effect, individuals’ cumulative outcomes over 10 years
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days in partial ret Days in partial ret Days in full-time Days in full-time
RD Estimate 275.665*** 277.828*** -256.356*** -238.668***
[22.118] [22.183] [38.918] [31.636]
Mean control group 185.048 185.048 1983.929 1983.929
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days not employed Days not employed Days unemployed Days unemployed
RD Estimate -27.406 -43.633* 1.167 -0.141
[26.259] [23.832] [8.723] [8.268]
Mean control group 1483.722 1483.722 122.473 122.473
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
PANEL C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days in disability Days in disability Days retirement Days retirement
RD Estimate -22.288 -32.556* 5.771 -2.618
[19.999] [19.430] [24.334] [21.308]
Mean control group 336.079 336.079 846.249 846.249
Observations 177764 177764 177764 177764
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: This table contains the the ITT estimates of outcomes cumulated over 10 years (measured in age from 50/55) of
being born such that pre-reform policy was available for individuals’ outcomes of the linear RDD framework as described in
section 1.4.1. The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated following the methodology
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b), though results are robust to the use of a predetermined
bandwidth of 12 months. Controls include gender, white/blue collar, firm size, earnings at 48/53, days tenure at 48/53,
working history of the last 10 years before turning 48/53 (sick days, days unemployed).
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Table 1.10: Summary statistics and selection into early effective retirement
High risk of early LF withdrawal
Row % Column %
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Gender
Men 28,38 71,62 100,00 30,42 76,76 53,59
Women 74,97 25,03 100,00 69,58 23,24 46,41
Total 50,00 50,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Blue/White collar
Blue collar 23,28 76,72 100,00 18,48 60,89 39,69
White collar 67,58 32,42 100,00 81,52 39,11 60,31
Total 50,00 50,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Monthly earnings
0 - 1300 60,86 39,14 100,00 12,40 7,97 10,19
1300 - 1999 49,04 50,96 100,00 23,96 24,89 24,43
2000-2999 45,33 54,67 100,00 30,31 36,55 33,43
≥ 3000 52,15 47,85 100,00 33,34 30,59 31,96
Total 50,00 50,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Tenure at firm
less than 1 year 50,26 49,74 100,00 6,81 6,74 6,78
1-5 years 47,22 52,78 100,00 18,98 21,22 20,10
5-10 years 49,60 50,40 100,00 18,79 19,09 18,94
over 10 years 51,14 48,86 100,00 55,42 52,95 54,18
Total 50,00 50,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Sick last 10 yr
No 57,61 42,39 100,00 90,24 66,39 78,32
Yes 22,51 77,49 100,00 9,76 33,61 21,68
Total 50,00 50,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Unemployed last 10 yr
No 52,80 47,20 100,00 81,89 73,20 77,54
Yes 40,32 59,68 100,00 18,11 26,80 22,46
Total 50,00 50,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
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Table 1.11: Summary statistics and selection into early effective retirement
High risk of early LF withdrawal
Row % Column %
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Firm size
4 - 40 58,77 41,23 100,00 29,09 20,41 24,75
40-199 43,91 56,09 100,00 22,13 28,27 25,20
200-999 41,26 58,74 100,00 22,64 32,23 27,44
≥ 1000 57,79 42,21 100,00 26,14 19,09 22,62
Total 50,00 50,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Industry
Manufacturing 6,18 93,82 100,00 3,54 53,76 28,65
Energy 88,95 11,05 100,00 3,38 0,42 1,90
Water and Sewage 34,95 65,05 100,00 0,36 0,68 0,52
Retail 33,55 66,45 100,00 11,50 22,77 17,14
Transportation 50,75 49,25 100,00 5,52 5,36 5,44
Information and Communication 48,55 51,45 100,00 1,54 1,63 1,59
Finance and Insurance 92,39 7,61 100,00 12,85 1,06 6,95
Real estate 55,60 44,40 100,00 1,98 1,58 1,78
Scientific and Technical Services 61,63 38,37 100,00 4,94 3,08 4,01
Other economic services 40,65 59,35 100,00 2,28 3,33 2,81
Public Administration, Defense 88,91 11,09 100,00 31,91 3,98 17,94
Education 96,31 3,69 100,00 2,12 0,08 1,10
Health and Social services 87,87 12,13 100,00 11,00 1,52 6,26
Art, Entertainment, Recreation 87,70 12,30 100,00 1,29 0,18 0,74
Other 91,07 8,93 100,00 5,80 0,57 3,18
Total 50,00 50,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
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Table 1.12: ITT effect, high risk individuals’ effect on age at retirement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retirement age Retirement age Age last employed Age last employed
RD Estimate 0.087 0.023 0.180* 0.158*
[0.118] [0.092] [0.096] [0.086]
Mean control group 61.375 61.375 59.128 59.128
Observations 88882 88882 88882 88882
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The results in this table are for individuals with above median propensity to withdraw from the labour force before
reaching the earliest formal retirement age. This table contains the the ITT estimates on retirement age of being born such
that pre-reform policy was available for individuals’ outcomes of the linear RDD framework as described in section 1.4.1.
The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated following the methodology proposed by
Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b), though results are robust to the use of a predetermined bandwidth of
12 months. Controls include gender, white/blue collar, firm size, earnings at 48/53, days tenure at 48/53, working history
of the last 10 years before turning 48/53 (sick days, days unemployed).
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Table 1.13: ITT effect, high risk individuals’ cumulative outcomes over 10 years
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days in partial ret Days in partial ret Days in full-time Days in full-time
RD Estimate 272.565*** 282.287*** -208.555*** -204.905***
[25.607] [24.929] [38.121] [35.081]
Mean control group 173.837 173.837 1702.812 1702.812
Observations 88882 88882 88882 88882
Controls No Yes No Yes
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days not employed Days not employed Days unemployed Days unemployed
RD Estimate -63.781** -80.255*** -20.809 -23.769*
[29.481] [30.126] [12.969] [13.344]
Mean control group 1776.081 1776.081 159.185 159.185
Observations 88882 88882 88882 88882
Controls No Yes No Yes
PANEL C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days in disability Days in disability Days retirement Days retirement
RD Estimate -62.633* -70.572** 0.697 -5.170
[36.705] [32.838] [35.091] [29.982]
Mean control group 493.988 493.988 928.131 928.131
Observations 88882 88882 88882 88882
Controls No Yes No Yes
Note: The results in this table are for individuals with above median propensity to withdraw from the labour force before
reaching the earliest formal retirement age. This table contains the the ITT estimates of outcomes cumulated over 10 years
(measured in age from 50/55) of being born such that pre-reform policy was available for individuals’ outcomes of the linear
RDD framework as described in section 1.4.1. The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are
calculated following the methodology proposed by Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b), though results are
robust to the use of a predetermined bandwidth of 12 months. Controls include gender, white/blue collar, firm size, earnings
at 48/53, days tenure at 48/53, working history of the last 10 years before turning 48/53 (sick days, days unemployed).
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Appendix: Figures
Figure 1.1: Timeline of retirement in Austria
Retirement timeline - Men
Retirement timeline - Women
39
Figure 1.2: Replacement rate of partial retirement
Note: This graph shows the expected fraction of fulltime wage received by the fraction of fulltime
hours worked. In particular it shows the size of the partial retirement subsidy if hours are
reduced to 40-60% of fulltime.
Figure 1.3: Total entries to partial retirement per month
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Note: This graph shows the total number of people newly entering a partial retirement scheme in
Austria by month. January 2004 is the date the reform described in section 1.2.2 was enacted.
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Figure 1.4: Total entries to partial retirement per month - above 51/56 year olds
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Note: This graph shows the total number of women above the age of 51 and men above the age
of 56 (one year after original eligibility age) newly entering a partial retirement scheme in Austria
by month. January 2004 is the date the reform described in section 1.2.2 was enacted. This
graph shows that the last minute effect is not only driven by people who experienced a hike in
the eligibility age at the time of the reform (from 50 to 50.5 or 55 to 55.5) but that in fact the
requirement of hiring a substitute worker was an important cause of the last minute effect in the
take-up rate.
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Figure 1.5: Ever on partial retirement by birthmonth
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Note: This graph shows the average probability of ever taking up the partial retirement policy
within 10 years from reaching the baseline eligibility age by birthmonth. It is based on the
sample of individuals born within three years from the cut-off as described in section 1.3. Persons
left of the cut-off could take advantage of the more lenient pre-reform version of partial
retirement. Persons born right of the cut-off were subject to the substitute worker requirement
and had an eligibility age increased by 6 months.
42
Figure 1.6: Yearly event study RDD - Employment
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(b) Days not employed
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(c) Days - full time employed
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Note: This figure shows the ITT estimates of the linear RDD framework as described in section 1.4.1 for each year of age
(measured age from 50/55). Model includes as controls: Gender, white/blue collar status, log earnings age 48/53, log firm
size, log tenure at the firm, dummies for ever having experienced unemployment or extended sickness in the past 10 years.
The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated following the methodology proposed
by Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b), though results are robust to the use of a predetermined bandwidth
of 12 months.
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Figure 1.7: Yearly event study RDD - Non-employment
(a) Days on disability
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(b) Days unemployed
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(c) Days retired
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Note: This figure shows the ITT estimates of the linear RDD framework as described in section 1.4.1 for each year of age
(measured age from 50/55). Model includes as controls: Gender, white/blue collar status, log earnings age 48/53, log firm
size, log tenure at the firm, dummies for ever having experienced unemployment or extended sickness in the past 10 years.
The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated following the methodology proposed
by Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b), though results are robust to the use of a predetermined bandwidth
of 12 months.
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Figure 1.8: Monthly firm’s outcomes around reform
Hires
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
R
dd
 e
ffe
ct
s 
on
 m
on
th
ly
 h
ire
s
2003m7 2003m9 2003m11 2004m1 2004m3 2004m5 2004m7 2004m9 2004m11 2005m1
Month
Treatment effect 95% CI
Still operating
-.02
0
.02
.04
R
dd
 e
ffe
ct
s 
on
 s
til
l o
pe
ra
tin
g
2003m7 2003m9 2003m11 2004m1 2004m3 2004m5 2004m7 2004m9 2004m11 2005m1
Month
Treatment effect 95% CI
Note: This figure shows the ITT estimates for total hires and the probability of operating of the firm of the linear RDD
framework as described in section 1.4.2 for each month around the reform. There are as many observations as there
are workers within the bandwidth in a firm, and each of those observations is weighted by the inverse of that number of
workers. In addition to the restrictions discussed in section 1.3 firms are part of the sample if they have 3-40 employees. This
specification controls for size and industry of the firm. The optimal bandwidth and robust standard errors (in parentheses)
are calculated following the methodology proposed by Calonico et al. (2014a) and Calonico et al. (2014b), though results
are robust to the use of a predetermined bandwidth of 12 months.
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Figure 1.9: Monthly event study RDD - Peers
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Note: This figure shows the ITT estimates for peers’ outcomes of the linear RDD framework as described in section 1.4.2
for each month around the reform. For each peer, there are as many observations as there are workers within the bandwidth
in a firm, and each of those observations is weighted by the inverse of peers×critical workers. Exit the firm is a binary
variable turning 1 when the peer leaves his/her current firm (regardless where he/she transitions to. Still at common
firm is 1 as long as the peer is still employed at the same firm as the firm where he/she was working with the ”critical
worker”. Log earnings are the log earnings received in that month, days unemployed the days spent in unemployment. The
specification controls for gender, age and pre-treatment earnings of the peer as well as the size of the initial firm in 2002.
For computational reasons these estimates are only computed for a predetermined bandwidth of 12 months. Standard
errors are clustered on the common firm level.)
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Chapter 2
Learning from Privilege:
Parental Background, Education and
Wage Dynamics.
2.1 Introduction
A young person’s educational and professional success depends in many ways on the one
of her parents. Human capital endowments of children from different backgrounds can
differ because some qualities and characteristics are genetically transmitted or shaped in
very early childhood. Moreover, the amount of time and money that parents choose to
invest in their child’s skills, learning, motivation or ”credentials” depends both on their
economic and cultural preferences as well as their intellectual and financial capabilities.
In this paper I will focus on the extent and effects of these latter differences. In particular,
I am trying to understand whether differences in the parental background of children can
be interpreted as a determinant of the cost to obtain education that is independent of
their ability endowments. Specifically I argue that having parents with a higher level of
education reduces the cost of obtaining a higher education for their children. I will show
that if this is the case, a situation arises in which young workers with the same innate
ability obtain different levels of schooling or - put differently - young workers with the
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same level of schooling but from different parental background have a different level of
innate ability.
Unfortunately ability is something that is very rarely observed directly in the data. I
therefore use a framework of employer learning - in which employers adapt their wages
to the true productivity of the worker over time - to test whether the implications of my
assertion hold true in the data.
When young workers enter the labour market it is in general difficult for employers to
directly observe their productivity. Instead they will rely on observable characteristics of
the worker to form expectations about her productive capabilities. Some of these observ-
able characteristics are exogenously given - like a person’s gender, race etc. - while others
can be altered or invested in by the individual in question - like for instance education.
Spence (1973) calls the former an index and the latter a signal. A signal is a costly action
that allows the worker to reveal information about her abilities. The reason this signal is
useful is that the cost of investing in a signal like education depends on an individual’s
innate ability - which is private information the employer would like to have.
The cost of obtaining signals like education naturally depends on other factors aside from
ability. For instance, a child that has to travel far to go to school may be less likely to
go there than one that lives right next to the school. Even if they have the same ability.
This does not mean that the signal is uninformative: On average, it will still be true that
children with higher ability invest more in schooling than those with low ability. However,
if one does not know which of the two children with the same level of schooling lived far
from the school and which lived closer one has to - in the absence of more information -
assign the same expected level of ability to both of them.
I argue that parental background constitutes such an unobservable cost to signal. In a
world in which - independently of their own abilities - it is more costly for young people
coming from a less educated family to obtain education themselves parental background
will introduce noise in the education signal. In particular, a person with high ability but
less advantaged parental background may end up investing in the same level of education
as a person with lower ability but very privileged family background.
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Employers who are trying to assess the ability of a newly hired worker but are not able,
allowed or willing to observe these differences in the family background will treat both of
them the same as they are indistinguishable from their point of view.
In this paper I want to test empirically whether the above hypothesis is likely to be true.
In the absence of a reliable measure of true ”ability” I invoke a theory on employer learn-
ing due to Harris and Holmstrom (1982) that assumes that workers are paid relative to
their expected marginal product at all times. As in the previous discussion at the point
of hiring a young worker the employer can only form expectations about her productivity
given observables and pays her accordingly. The idea of employer learning however is that
over time, the employer learns about the true ability of the worker so that after some
time the employee’s wages come closer and closer to her true marginal productivity. If the
above hypothesis is true, then the implication of this model is that given a set of initial
observable characteristics the wages of the worker with less privileged background will
rise while the wages of the worker from a privileged family will fall (or rise less steeply).
I use data on the employment and education history of young adults from the German
Socio-Economic Panel to perform a first empirical assessment of this theory. I find indeed
that controlling for other factors at the beginning of the career the slope of the wage curve
is negatively related to the level of education of the father.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview on
related literature, Section 3 formalises the ideas outlined above about education sig-
nalling with noise, Section 4 discusses the empirical implementation and results, Section
5 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This work contributes to the extensive literature on social mobility. Theorised for instance
by Becker and Tomes (1994) intergenerational income mobility has been empirically es-
timated among others by Solon (1992), Zimmerman (1992) and Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti
(1997) who have documented the correlation between the earnings of fathers and sons.
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More specifically, in the context of education Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) find parent’s
educational attainment to be strongly correlated to their children’s educational attain-
ment in British households between 1991-1997. Feinstein and Symons (1999) show that
factors indicating parental interest in the education of their children play a particularly
important role in children’s secondary school performance. In the context of Germany
Dustmann (2004) demonstrates the effect of parental education on wages through the
early tracking mechanism of the German educational system.
Furthermore my present work draws on the literature on internal labour market dynamics.
Models of symmetric employer learning (Harris and Holmstrom (1982) lay the foundation
for my empirical framework which relies heavily on Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji
and Pierret (2001) and Lange (2007). Farber and Gibbons (1996) demonstrate that em-
ployers indeed learn about innate ability over time by finding an increasing relationship
of wages with an ability measure unobserved by the employer over time. Altonji and
Pierret (2001) provide evidence that employers statistically discriminate on the basis of
education when they do not have information about the true ability of the worker. Using
a structural model of employer learning Lange (2007) estimates the highly relevant and
interesting speed of employer learning to be relatively fast. According to his estimates
the initial expectation errors about workers productivity decline by 50% in the first 3
years of a worker’s career.
2.3 Education Signalling with Noise
In this first part of the theory I will briefly show how an additional factor influencing
the cost of signalling can lead to partially separating equilibria in the Spence signalling
model (Spence (1973)) where some individuals with different levels of ability nevertheless
decide to invest in the same level of education.
This analysis applies the logic of Riley (2001) and Streb (2006). To avoid unnecessary
calculations I will do this in the simplest possible setup with two levels of ability θ ∈ {θ, θ}
and two levels of parental background b ∈ {b, b}. The probabilities of the four different
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resulting types of agent are given by: P
(
θ = θ, b = b
)
= phh, P
(
θ = θ, b = b
)
= phl,
P
(
θ = θ, b = b
)
= plh and P (θ = θ, b = b) = pll
The cost c(θ, b, s) of obtaining the signal education s is increasing in s but decreasing in
θ - as in the standard signalling model - but also b.
Given s an employer will form a belief µ about the probability of facing a high productivity
type. The employer is risk neutral and operates in a competitive market and therefore
pays a wage w equal to the expected productivity of the worker.
Agents of all types maximise expected utility given by:
U(w, s, θ, b) = w − c(s, θ, b)
where cs > 0 and cs,θ(s, θ, b) < 0 and cs,b(s, θ, b) < 0
In my simple setup with four types there are two possibilities:
c(s, θ, b) < c(s, θ, b) < c(s, θ, b) < c(s, θ, b) (2.1)
c(s, θ, b) < c(s, θ, b) < c(s, θ, b) < c(s, θ, b) (2.2)
Note that which of the two cases applies depends both on the relation between cs,θ(s, θ, b)
and cs,b(s, θ, b) as well as θ − θ = ∆θ and b − b = ∆b. (1) is a situation that is not far
away from the standard scenario in Spence (1973). There is a separating equilibrium in
which any high ability type will choose a level of the education s = sh while any low type
chooses s = 0 and the employers beliefs are formed accordingly.
Additionally, all pooling and partially pooling equilibria can be eliminated by the
intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)). In a setting of more types one may need
stronger criteria to eliminate these equilibria (Banks and Sobel (1987)) but ultimately
only a single separating equilibrium remains (a version of the Riley equilibrium (Riley
(1979))). Intuitively, this is a case where b is not able to introduce enough noise in the
signal to make it impossible to distinguish high from low ability types. The high ability
type will always find it worthwhile to invest just a little more in education than her low
ability counterpart in order to unambiguously signal her high ability.
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In (2) exactly this is not the case. Clearly, the type (θ, b) is not in a position to invest
more than the (θ, b) type. In this case, there can be no fully separating equilibrium.
However, any full pooling equilibrium can also be discarded: The type (θ, b) can always
deviate to a higher level of education than the others and clearly signal her high ability.
In this case, an equilibrium exists where type (θ, b) and type (θ, b) are bunched together.
In this equilibrium type (θ, b) will not invest in education, (θ, b) and type (θ, b) will invest
in an intermediate level sm while (θ, b) will again signal her unequivocal superiority with
sh. The corresponding equilibrium beliefs are:

µ(θ = θ|s = sh) = 1
µ(θ = θ|s = sm) = phl
phl+plh
µ(θ = θ|s = 0) = 0
Why is this type of pooling equilibrium not eliminated by the intuitive or divinity cri-
terion? While the type of high ability but low parental background cannot profitably
invest in a higher level of education than the type with low ability and high parental
background, the latter has no way of gaining from a deviation. Since he is the one po-
tentially benefiting from the largest set of responses to his deviation, it will always be
him who is attached the largest probability of deviation relative to (θ, b) or (θ, b). This
implies that firms would offer a wage too low for the deviation to be profitable for any
type.
The existence of this particular equilibrium both motivates and serves as a starting point
for my empirical analysis. Notice that in the above equilibrium:
E [θ|s = sm] = phlθ + plhθ
phl + plh
but that
E [θ|s = sm, b] =
 θ ifb = bθ ifb = b
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For an individual sending signal sm I can write:
θi = E [θi|si = sm] + ui (2.3)
where ui = θi − E [θi|si = sm] - the component of θ that cannot be predicted by s - is
decreasing in bi.
Above, I have stated that an employer pays a newly hired young worker exactly according
to her expected productivity so wi0 = E [θi|si] where wi0 denotes the wage of individual
i at time 0 of her career.
In the context of employer learning (as in Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and
Pierret (2001)) each period of the working relationship the employer observes additional
information ξit = θi + it about the true productivity of worker i (I will suppress the
subscript i from this point onwards) which is equivalent to the information dt = ξt −
E [θ|s] = u+ t where t is a mean-zero error term independent of s or θ.
Wages will further develop in the following way:
wt = E [θ|s,Dt] = E [θ|s] + E [u|s,Dt]
whereDt is the set of all additional information collected up to point t: Dt = {d1, d2, ..., dt}
where D0 = ∅.
Note that E [u|s,D0] = 0 while limt→∞E [u|s,Dt] = u.
In the beginning of this section I have described a situation in which children of parents
with a low educational attainment face an additional cost to invest in an educational
signal and an equilibrium arises that bunches several types of different ability levels and
different parental background together. If this is true, then u is decreasing in b and since
E [θ|s] is constant over time we should expect that wages are decreasing in b with expe-
rience as the employer learns about the true ability of the worker.
This analysis has shown that the relation of u and b will be key to determine whether or
not the hypothesis discussed in the introduction is true. In the next section I will discuss
how I tackle this problem empirically.
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2.4 Econometric Setup and Results
The equations above already offer a good starting point for an empirical analysis. How-
ever, to gain a more realistic view on the wage determination process I will slightly enrich
this specification following Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001). I
have ignored two important issues so far: The first is human capital acquisition. In the
empirical specification it will be useful to allow productivity to grow with experience. To
do this a deterministic function of human capital growth is added to the model H(t) with
H(0) = 0. Practically this will amount to the introduction of a time trend (of possibly
higher order) into the regression.
The second issue I have not addressed is the fact that naturally employers do not hire
and form expectations about the productivity of their workers purely based on their edu-
cational attainment. They may use other public information available such as a worker’s
gender or age. On the other hand they may decide on entry wage based on information
available to them through the hiring process that I cannot identify or observe. This infor-
mation can, of course be correlated with parental background. In fact, while my analysis
builds on the assumption that employers cannot ex ante observe family background per-
fectly, it is likely that they observe factors that are correlated to it - like an accent or
a person’s name. The fact that this information is correlated with parental background
and omitted in the data may pose a number of problems to my analysis that I will discuss
later on. For now let me re-specify the simple model above in the following way:
Let s be a vector of variables both observed by the employer at the point of hiring and ob-
servable in the data - like age. Let q be a vector of variables observed by the employer but
not contained in the data - like a candidate’s communication skills. Let b be a worker’s
parental background contained in the data but not (fully) observed by the employer and
let θ be a worker’s innate ability unobserved both by the employer at the point of hiring
and by the data. The employer sets the wage wt according to his expectations about the
worker’s productivity yt:
wt = E [yt|s, q] = α1s+ α2q + α3E [θ|s, q,Dt] +H(t) + ζt
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Both s and q can directly increase the worker’s marginal product yt but also serve as a
signal to form a belief about θ. ζt is a mean-zero error term orthogonal to s, q and b.
Estimating the wage equation with the observable data using OLS will be a linear pro-
jection E∗ of wt on s and b.
wt =α1s+ α2E
∗ [q|s, b] + α3E∗ [E [θ|s, q,Dt] |s, b] +H∗(t) (2.4)
=α1s+ α2E
∗ [q|s, b] + α3E∗ [E [θ|s, q] |s, b] + α3E∗ [E [u|Dt] |s, b] +H∗(t) (2.5)
Let the linear approximation of E [θ|s, q] be
E∗ [θ|s, q] = γ1s+ γ2q + u (2.6)
where u is orthogonal to s and q by construction.
Furthermore, because I cannot directly observe q, I have to define what a regression
omitting q picks up by defining the linear projection:
q = β1s+ β2b+ z (2.7)
So what is estimated in a linear projection of wt on s and b? From the equations (6), (7)
with (5) above we get:
wt = ψ1s+ ψ2b = (α1 + α2β1 + α3(γ1 + γ2β1 + Φst))s+ (α2β2 + α3(γ2β2 + Φbt))b
where Φst and Φbt are the coefficients of a linear regression of E [u|Dt] on s and b.
If cov (s, E [u|Dt]) = 0 then Φst and Φbt can be written as
Φbt =νtΦb
Φst =νtΦs
where νt =
cov(b,E[u|Dt])
cov(b,u)
∈ [0, 1] and Φb and Φs are the coefficients of a regression of u on b
and s (see Altonji and Pierret (2001)). This is important, because if νt is non-negative it
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allows to conclude that the sign of the estimated coefficient Φbt corresponds to the sign
of Φb which is the relationship between u and b given s.
2.4.1 Identification
At this point, it is important to note, that u is not the ”residual” of E [θ|s] but of E [θ|s, q].
Unless q is independent of s and b I cannot determine whether it is education that is the
signal that is more costly to people from low parental background or whether it is any
other signal from q. This is an issue I will not solve in this paper. In addition however
one should expect that q is used to some degree to predict b at the beginning of a worker’s
career. As time goes by and the employer learns about true ability this factor will become
less important and ability will get more weight in the wage determination process. If we
could control for q as we do for s this process would not matter for our coefficient Φbt.
Given that we cannot do that, b - that is correlated with q - will necessarily pick up part
of this ”losing importance”1. To see this in detail, please refer to the technical appendix.
The first strategy to improve identification in this case is to control for individual
characteristics that could have an influence on wage growth, like gender or migration
background etc. I will present the results of an OLS regression of wage on schooling,
parental background and a time trend with and without controls for some of these back-
ground characteristics in Table 2.3.
Another solution to these identification problems is to rid b of the part that is ”contam-
inated” by q as in Farber and Gibbons (1996). For this purpose I regress b on education
and the set of observables used as controls above as well as the initial wage w0. The idea
is that w0 contains the relevant information on q so that the residual b
∗ is orthogonal
to q and s. In the next step, I substitute b with b∗ and perform the same estimation as
described above. b∗ is an estimator of e in the above equations so that Φb∗ = ρ3. Note
however that this procedure may not be fully effective in the likely case that wages are
observed with measurement error. Then this ”cleansing” procedure may be incomplete.
1This does not mean that q if included in the regression would have a negative coefficient, rather its
sign would depend on cov(b, q) and cov(b, u)
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The results of these regressions are presented in Table 2.4. To somewhat account for
any type of sorting into firms all specifications control for the type of employment (blue
collar, white collar), the industry and the size of the company. Individual level controls
include the age at the first job, sex, migration background and cohort of the individual as
well as their interactions with the time trend. Year fixed effects are also included. Taking
into account that the speed of learning as estimated by Lange (2007) is relatively fast
I estimate the model for 3 different time horizons. The shortest time horizon observes
wages only up to the third year after the entry in the labour force. I also do the analysis
for years 0-5 in the labour market and 0-10 years. Because the effect of human capital
accumulation as well as employer learning is likely to decrease with experience the time
trend included is quadratic for all specifications except the one with the shortest time
horizon. This model contains only a linear time trend.
2.4.2 Data and Sample Selection
To perform the estimates described above I use survey data of young adults of the German
Socio-Economic Panel2. This survey includes yearly information about current occupa-
tional status, wages, industry as well as personal characteristics such as education and
importantly, detailed account of parental education. The data is available from 1984-
2013 and I use all waves. The variable I use to determine parental background b is an
indicator on whether or not the father has obtained post-secondary education. For the
individual young workers themselves, I use a much more detailed measure of education,
that combines both scholastic and vocational training the individual may have gotten. As
the relevant measure of working experience I use potential experience, that is the years
passed since the entry in the labour force. I consider an entry in the labour force the first
time they are observed with a wage out of full-time work. Hence, prior part-time work
experience is not accounted for.
I keep individuals who are observed for a minimum of 5 years after they start working
and drop all those from the sample that are self-employed or work as a public servant.
2Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for years 1984-2013, version 30, SOEP, 2014,
doi:10.5684/soep.v30.
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I restrict attention to those who make a permanent transition from non-employment to
employment and thus worked full-time for at least 2
3
of the time observed and consider
only positive earnings. My objective is to understand how and to what extent employ-
ers adjust their wages to what they learn about individual workers. If an individual is
currently unemployed, I do not have information on that individual’s potential earnings.
This is thus a restriction to obtain meaningful results on the degree to which employers
adapt their wages to what they learn about a worker’s ability.3 I also use only individuals
who do not change their educational attainment during the period of observation. Given
these selection criteria, the sample size is 810 individuals.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present some summary statistics of the sample. The sample is slightly
more male than female. The most common forms of education are lower or intermediate
secondary school with an apprenticeship or University. Blue and white collar jobs at first
entry into the labour market are pretty evenly distributed. From Table 2.2 it is clear
that children of college educated fathers enter the labour market older and at a higher
wage and tend to remain there also after 5 years. This is however not accounting for
their education as I will in the following exercise.
2.4.3 Estimation Results
Table 2.3 shows the estimation results with ”contaminated” b. The coefficient Φbt is
negative throughout but ceases to be significant at the 10 year horizon model. This is
coherent with the estimated speed of learning in Lange (2007). After 5 years in the labour
market, the learning effect will be very small which means that the return to ability and
hence b decreases. This is also reflected in the positive coefficient on experience squared
interacted with b. It means that until a five year horizon individuals with the same
training but worse parental background have a steeper earnings profile, but decreasingly
so. Adding the controls has no large effects on the point estimates which is reassuring
considering the discussion about the set of variables q. Looking at Table 2.4 one can see,
however, that the coefficients become slightly less sizable for the ”clean” b∗. Yet, they
3That being said, the results are qualitatively robust to the inclusion of periods of unemployment.
However, due to the increased variation, the estimates are less precise.
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are still negative until the 5 year horizon model and remain for the most part statistically
significant. Note that the results for b∗ without controls imply that also b∗ was generated
from a regression of b on education and the initial wage without any of the controls.
Overall the short term results tend to be in support of the idea that, given observable
characteristics at the entry in the labour market, wages of workers from less educated
families grow faster than those of workers from more educated families. The time horizon
that seems to be decisive for this process is consistent with a framework of educational
signalling, employer learning and statistical discrimination. It is to be noted, however
that the results are also consistent with other theories.
Another one of the most widespread interpretations of wage growth over time is the accu-
mulation of human capital (Becker (1962), Mincer et al. (1974)). In this analysis I have
allowed for a deterministic time trend in the wages and hence for experience as a rele-
vant factor in wage determination. As I have already discussed, speed of human capital
accumulation could in principle depend on q, but also on s or b or the unobservable θ.
In the empirical part of this paper, I have accounted for this fact by adding interactions
of all observables with the time trends. I have also used b∗ in my analysis that should
be orthogonal to any of the factors in s or q. This can take into account the fact that q
or s - that are correlated with b could be correlated with the speed of learning as well.
Therefore, my results should not be driven by human capital accumulation that depends
on q or s. If b were directly related to the return to experience then we would expect
this effect to be positive. One can think for instance of parents who are pushing their
children’s careers by intervening in their favour. This is not consistent with my results.
What would be consistent with my results is some form of ”catching up” by children from
less educated backgrounds in terms of non-formal or soft skills not observed in the data.
Given my methodology though, it would have to be the case that the initial lack of these
”soft skills” is not observed by the employer at the point of hiring or not reflected in the
initial wage.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented some support for the hypothesis that workers with identical
observable characteristics at the entry in the labour market have different wage dynamics
depending on their parental background. In particular, I find that wages of young adults
whose parents have a low educational attainment grow faster with respect to the wages of
their colleagues from more educated families in their early career. I interpret this finding
in an educational signalling - employer learning context and argue that children from less
educated families tend to achieve a lower level of education than others even when their
abilities are the same. This is because they face an additional cost to invest in education
that is independent from their true productivity. The precise nature of this cost as well
as the signal it affects should be the subject of further research on this topic.
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Appendix: Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics 1
Percent Observations
Gender
Male 58,40 473
Female 41,60 337
Total 100,00 810
Highest level of education or training
No degree/drop out 1,23 10
Lower secondary 6,54 53
Intermediate secondary 5,31 43
Entrance exam tertiary 1,48 12
Upper secondary 1,85 15
Other schooling degree 2,10 17
Apprenticeship with secondary 15,43 125
Apprenticeship with intermed. secondary 23,21 188
Apprenticeship with upper secondary 6,30 51
Apprenticeship with other degree 6,17 50
Health care school 6,67 54
Special technical school 1,23 10
Other vocational degree 1,23 10
Uni applied sciences 5,80 47
University 15,43 125
Total 100,00 810
Father college
No 84,69 686
Yes 15,31 124
Total 100,00 810
First job blue collar
No 58,15 471
Yes 41,85 339
Total 100,00 810
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics 2
Min Max Median
Entry wage monthly
Father college:
No 164.00 5,271.00 1,344.00
Yes 312.00 6,904.00 1,784.00
Total 164.00 6,904.00 1,400.00
Monthly wage after 5 years
Father college:
No 256.00 10,226.00 1,900.00
Yes 578.00 7,000.00 2,679.50
Total 256.00 10,226.00 2,000.00
Age entry to labour market
Father college:
No 17.00 34.00 22.00
Yes 19.00 33.00 25.00
Total 17.00 34.00 22.00
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Table 2.3: Estimation results - simple b
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Father college 0.071* 0.039 0.074* 0.043 0.042 0.013
[0.039] [0.035] [0.041] [0.037] [0.039] [0.035]
Father college=1× Experience -0.030** -0.024* -0.060** -0.055** -0.005 -0.001
[0.014] [0.013] [0.024] [0.022] [0.014] [0.014]
Father college=1× Experience squ – – 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.001 0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.001] [0.002]
Observations 3044 3044 4537 4537 6887 6887
Horizon years 0-3 0-3 0-5 0-5 0-10 0-10
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time trend linear linear quadratic quadratic quadratic quadratic
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include year fixed effects,
education, blue collar/white collar, industry and size of company, age at the first job, sex, migration background, cohort
as well as their interactions with the time trend.
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Table 2.4: Estimation results - ”cleaned” b∗
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
b∗ 0.023 0.038 0.024 0.042 -0.005 0.013
[0.039] [0.035] [0.041] [0.037] [0.039] [0.035]
Experience× b∗ -0.022 -0.024* -0.046* -0.055** 0.004 -0.001
[0.014] [0.013] [0.024] [0.022] [0.014] [0.014]
Experience squ× b∗ – – 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.000 0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.001] [0.002]
Observations 3044 3044 4537 4537 6887 6887
Horizon years 0-3 0-3 0-5 0-5 0-10 0-10
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time trend linear linear quadratic quadratic quadratic quadratic
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls include year fixed effects,
education, blue collar/white collar, industry and size of company, age at the first job, sex, migration background, cohort
as well as their interactions with the time trend. In this specification father’s education b is ”cleaned” of everything an
employer may have observed at hiring by regressing it on the initial wage and taking only the residual b∗.
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Technical Appendix
Following up on the discussion in section 2.4.1 let’s say we observed θ as well as s, b and
q and that a projection of b on s and q is b = k1s + k2q + e and a linear projection of θ
on the three other variables is:
θ =ρ1s+ ρ2q + ρ3b+ v
=(ρ1 + ρ3k1)s+ (ρ2 + ρ3k2)q + ρ3e+ v
=E∗ [θ|s, q] + ρ3e+ v
=E∗ [θ|s, q] + u
So u is related to s and b in the following way:
u =ρ3e+ v
=ρ3(b− k1s− k2q) + v
=ρ3(1− k2β2)b+ ρ3(−k1 − k2β1)s− ρ3k2z + v
=Φbb+ Φss+ v˜
The parameter of interest for the present analysis is really ρ3. It describes how b relates
to innate ability that cannot be predicted by the observable signals in s and q. In a case
in which young adults with low b have a higher cost of sending these positive signals, ρ3
will be negative. Note that if I could observe q alongside of s and b then the coefficients of
a regression of u on b s and q would be ρ3, −ρ3k1 and −ρ3k2 respectively. The coefficients
of s and q reflect exactly the fact that the two variables are correlated with b and are
hence used by the employer to predict b. Given that we do not observe q, b will pick up
part of the q that loses relevance in the regression. This is reflected by −k2β2 < 0.
Note that this bias is generated by the relationship between b and q despite the fact that
I am still assuming that H(t) is unrelated to q or b. The omitted variable q constitutes
an even more serious problem in my analysis if this assumption does not hold. If q has
an influence on the speed of human capital acquisition H(t) and b is related to q, then
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the coefficient Φbt will pick up this effect. It is difficult to sign this bias since the nature
q or its relation to b or H(t) is not known.
Intuitively it is hard to imagine that b generates an advantage in terms of human capital
accumulation for people with a less educated parental background through this channel.
I would tentatively argue that capital accumulation that depends on the part of q that
is correlated with b is likely to bias my results upwards. For instance if q contains an
accent associated to disadvantages areas, this is not likely to contribute positively to wage
growth. However, I cannot exclude a bias in the opposite direction.
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Chapter 3
National Wage Equalization and
Regional Misallocation:
Evidence from Italian and German
Provinces
with Tito Boeri, Andrea Ichino, Enrico Moretti.
3.1 Introduction
Wage and earnings inequality are large and rising in many countries. Different countries
have adopted different labor market institutions to try to mitigate labor market inequality,
including minimum wages, transfers targeting low wage workers like the Earned Income
Tax Credit and unions contracts.
In most European countries, collective bargaining agreements are common practice
and cover the majority of workers. Typically, firms and unions belonging to a specific
sector bargain over an occupation-specific wage schedule. This wage schedule applies
to all workers in that sector, irrespective of their location. The objective is to equalize
salaries across employers and thus reduce inequality. For example, car manufacturers
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bargain with their unions over wages that apply to all car manufacturing establishments
in the country; banks bargain with banking sector unions over wages for the entire bank-
ing sector, and so on. Collective bargaining are prevalent in Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden, although countries differ on how binding the national
agreements are (European Central Bank, 2008).
In this paper, we investigate an important but under-researched feature of wage equal-
ization systems. We argue that while national wage equalization may be successful at
compressing wage inequality in a country, it can have significant unintended consequences,
as it can create costly imbalances between cities and regions as a result of geographical
productivity differences. Specifically, in the presence of geographic differences in produc-
tivity, wage equalization across localities can generate significant misallocations. Firms in
areas where productivity is low need to pay wages above the local market clearing level,
which may lead to lower employment, investment and output in those areas. From a
macroeconomic point of view, this may result in lower GDP, employment, and aggregate
earnings.
We study the local and aggregate effects of national wage bargaining systems by
comparing Italy and Germany. Italy and Germany represent two useful case studies.
Both make extensive use of collective bargaining agreements, but the level of resulting
wage flexibility is markedly different. Italian nationwide sectoral contracts are more
binding and allow for only limited local wage adjustments. This means that within each
sector, firms in high productivity and low productivity areas face largely the same wage
schedule.1 Germany previously had a similar nationwide wage setting system, but after
reunification their system was made more flexible. Due to concerns about significantly
lower productivity among Eastern firms, since 1996 Germany has implemented so-called
“opening clauses” that allow firms to negotiate locally with unions, outside the nationwide
agreements (Schnabel, 1998).
1While firms can increase wages above the national contract schedule, they cannot lower them in
most cases. National wage floors are binding enough that the amount of wage variation that comes from
establishment-level bargaining is empirically small relative to the amount of variation stemming from
national contracts. We provide a detailed discussion of these institutions and the exceptions below.
70
Our empirical analysis comprises two parts. In the first part, we study the relationship
between local firm productivity and local nominal wages, non-employment rates, cost of
living, and real wages, defined as nominal wages deflated by the local cost of living. Our
geographic unit of analysis is an Italian “Province” (103 in total) or German “Spacial
Planning Region” or “Raumordnungsregion” (96 in total). In the second part, we quantify
the aggregate costs of spatial misallocation in Italy (compared to Germany) in terms of
forgone employment, aggregate output and per-capita earnings.
Empirically, Italy and Germany have a similar cross-province standard deviation in
mean firm productivity, as measured by firm value-added.2 In Italy, firm value added
is significantly higher in the North than in the South: In 2014, the gross value-added
per worker in a average firm of Milano, for example, was 71% above the value-added in
a average firm of Cosenza, in the southern region of Calabria. Similarly, in Germany
productivity is significantly higher in the West than in the East: the value-added per
worker in a average firm in Munich is 83% above the value-added in a average firm of North
Thuringen in East Germany.3 In Italy, the North-South productivity gap reflects long-
lasting historical differences in transportation infrastructure, distance from European
markets, efficiency of local governments and local policies, criminal activity, and cultural
norms, while in Germany, the East-West gap likely reflects half a century of Communist
rule in the East as well as other historical factors.4
While Italy and Germany have similar geographic distribution of firm productivity,
they have important differences in the geographic distribution of nominal wages, likely
reflecting wage bargaining differences in the two countries. In Italy, there is a much
2Gross value added is output valued at basic prices less intermediate consumption valued at purchasers
prices. The basic price is the amount receivable by the producer from the purchaser for a unit of a product
or service minus any tax on the product plus any subsidy on the product.
3Similar geographic differences exist in most countries in Europe and outside Europe. In the US,
total factor productivity of firms in cities at the top of the TFP distribution is more than double that
of cities at the bottom of the distribution (Hornbeck and Moretti, 2018). Data for gross value added in
Italy and Germany from the OECD (2018a).
4As we will show, the North-South productivity gap in Italy is remarkably similar to the West-East
productivity gap in Germany. In 2014, the difference in mean value-added between the Northern Italian
and Southern Italian firms was 19.0%. The corresponding difference between West and East German
firms was almost identical: 19.9%. In this paper, we will take these differences as given. Our analysis will
focus on the effects of these differences, rather than their causes. The literature on regional productivity
differences is immense. Examples for Italy include Banfield, 1958, Putnam et al., 1993, Ichino and Maggi,
2000, Buonanno et al., 2015, and Bigoni et al., 2016). An example for Germany isBurda and Hunt, 2001).
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stronger degree of wage equalization across provinces than in Germany. For example, after
controlling for worker characteristics the 90-10 percentile difference in mean wages across
provinces is 42.9% in Germany, more than four times larger than the 10.3% difference in
Italy. The mean wage difference between the North and the South in Italy is 4.2%, while
the mean West-East difference in Germany is seven times larger: 28.2%, despite similar
productivity differences.
Crucially, we find a marked difference in the relationship between local productivity
and local nominal wages in the two countries. If wages can fully adjust, our model
indicates that we should see a tight relationship between the two, with areas that enjoy
higher firm productivity also having proportionally higher mean nominal wages. This
is indeed the case in the US (Hornbeck and Moretti, 2018). By contrast, if wages are
prevented from fully adjusting, we should see a weaker relationship. In the extreme case
of fully-binding national contracts with complete nominal wage equalization, we should
see no relationship at all. When we regress log mean nominal wage (adjusted for workers
characteristics) on log value-added across provinces, we find an elasticity of wages with
respect to value-added of 0.19 in Italy and 0.73–almost four times larger–in Germany.
Thus, German firms appear to be significantly more able to adjust nominal wages to local
productivity than Italian firms.
A simple spatial equilibrium model has several predictions for Italy and Germany,
which appear consistent with our data. First, our model predicts that in Italy, where
wages cannot fully adjust, provinces with low productivity should have higher non-
employment rates. This should be less true in Germany, where wages can adjust more
to local productivity. Indeed, when we regress local non-employment rate on local value-
added we find that the elasticity of non employment rates with respect to value-added is
negative in both countries–indicating that provinces with lower value-added have higher
non-employment rates–but the elasticity in Italy is -1.41 (0.03), almost six times larger
(in absolute value) than Germany’s -0.25 (0.02) elasticity. Our findings are not driven by
the existence of an informal sector in Italy.
Second, the model indicates that since workers can move across regions, low produc-
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tivity provinces should have lower housing prices, both in Italy and Germany. Empirically
this is the case: we find a positive relationship between housing prices and local produc-
tivity.
Third, there are striking implications for real wages. In Italy we find a negative rela-
tionship between real wages and local value-added. Despite having higher productivity,
provinces in the North have lower real wages than provinces in the South, since the South
has low housing costs but similar nominal wages. This means that employed Italians are
better off working in the South in terms of purchasing power. However, the probability
of having a job is higher in the North. One way to think about geographic differences
in Italy is that national wage contracts have created a spatial equilibrium where workers
queue for jobs in the South. If they find a job, they are better off than their colleagues
in the North in terms of real wages, but while queued they remain not-employed. By
contrast, in Germany, we do not see that real wages in the West are lower than the East,
since nominal wages are spatially more flexible.
Overall, the current wage-setting system in Italy appears inefficient: firms in provinces
where productivity is low face wages well above the local market-clearing level. At the
local level, this implies that output and employment in those provinces are below what
they could be if wages were flexible. At the national level, this implies losses in GDP and
employment.
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we estimate the aggregate costs stemming
from spatial misallocation in Italy in terms of forgone aggregate earnings and employment.
What would happen if nominal wages were allowed to reflect local productivity? This
could happen if Italy adopted a system similar to contemporary Germany’s, in which
union contracts can be negotiated at the firm or province level instead of the national
level.
Our model indicates that while wages would decline in low productivity provinces,
output and employment in low productivity provinces would increase, resulting in an
overall increase in aggregate output and aggregate employment in the country. Aggregate
labor earnings would also increase, but only if the elasticity of labor demand is larger
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than one. Intuitively, an elastic labor demand means that the increase in employment in
low productivity areas more than offsets the decline in wages.5
To empirically quantify the magnitude of these effects, we provide estimates from a
counterfactual scenario in which we consider what would happen if the Italian relation-
ships between wages and value added and between non-employment and value added were
the same as those observed in Germany. To be clear, we do not assume that wages or em-
ployment or value added are the same in the two countries; rather, we apply to Italy the
elasticity of wages with respect to value added and the elasticity of non-employment with
respect to value added that we have estimated for Germany. For each Italian province,
we use those elasticities to quantify counterfactual wages and employment, whatever the
value added level of that province.
We find that average wages in Southern provinces would decrease by 5.90%, while
Southern employment would increase by 24.6%, or about 2.5 million jobs. On net, ag-
gregate earnings in the South would increase by 16.59%. Nationwide, we estimate that
aggregate employment would increase by 11.04% and aggregate earnings would increase
by 7.45%. This amounts to around 600 euros per year for each working-age adult.
We conclude that in the aggregate, allowing union contracts some degree of local
flexibility would improve the efficiency of labor allocation in Italy, resulting in increased
employment, aggregate income, and per capita labor income. There would also be dis-
tributional consequences, as currently-employed workers in the South would face lower
nominal and real wages.
Our findings are relevant to countries other than Italy and Germany, as the Italian
and German system are by no means unique. Broadly speaking, France, Belgium, Por-
tugal, Finland, Iceland, and Slovenia have a system similar to the Italian model, while
Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden are closer to the German model
(OECD, 2017 and 2018). Countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain have recently mov-
ing from a bargaining system similar to Italy’s to a ”controlled decentralization” which
is not unlike the German system. France has long debated the desirability of a more
5Labor demand—at least in the traded sector—is likely to be elastic in the case of an open economy
like Italy, which is fully integrated in European product markets.
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decentralized bargaining system, and such reform was initially part of the labor market
reforms proposed by President Macron in 2017, though it was subsequently dropped due
to strong union opposition. While the level of macroeconomic benefit from such reforms
is likely to vary from country to country depending on the extent of productivity differ-
ences across regions, it is safe to conclude that countries with binding national contracts
would improve efficiency if they moved toward the German wage-setting model.
Our paper is part of a growing body of work that focuses on the causes and conse-
quences of misallocation.6 The US represents an interesting specular example of spatial
misallocation. In the US case, little prevents nominal wages from adjusting.7 However
local employment is de facto constrained in many highly productivity cities, resulting in
large spatial misallocation. Hsieh and Moretti (forthcoming) have found large efficiency
losses in the form of forgone output and earnings caused by land use regulations that
limit housing supply in the most productive cities, thereby constraining the flow of la-
bor toward high-TFP locations. By contrast, in the Italian case nothing constrains local
employment or mobility, but local wages cannot adjust to local labor demand conditions.8
Our paper is also part of the literature on centralized wage bargaining. While much
research has been devoted to the effects of centralized wage bargaining in Italy, Germany
and other European countries9, the effects on the geography of employment and wages
and their aggregate costs have not previously been studied.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe the institutional setting
and wage determination mechanisms in Italy and Germany. Section 3.3 describes our
theoretical model and its predictions. Section 3.4 describes the data. Empirical evidence
is presented and discussed in Section 3.5. The aggregate costs of spatial wage rigidity are
analyzed in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.
6Restuccia and Rogerson (2017) provides a recent survey.
7While the US has a minimum wage, its effects are likely to be different. For one, the federal min-
imum wage is not as binding as national contracts in Italy. Second, is significant geographic variation
in minimum wages, with state- and city-level minimum wages significantly more binding than the fed-
eral minimum wage. Third, minimum wages only apply to low-wage workers, while European national
contracts define wage floors for all levels of employment, excluding top management.
8Other authors have used similar models to measure the effect of state taxes (Fajgelbaum et al., 2015),
internal trade frictions (Redding, 2013), infrastructure (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015), and land misallocation
(Duranton and Puga, 2014).
9For example, Calmfors and Horn (1986), Boeri et al. (2001), and Iversen (1996).
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3.2 Wage Setting Mechanisms in Italy, Germany and
Other European Countries
We begin by briefly describing the main features of the wage bargaining systems in Italy
and Germany. We then discuss which among European countries have wage bargaining
systems close to the Italian or German model. We stress that the specifics of a given
country’s labor market institutions are quite complex. We do not seek to provide a
comprehensive description of all the features of the wage-setting systems in each European
country, but instead seek to distill the key differences relevant in our analysis, abstracting
from many less crucial details.
Italy. Wage bargaining institutions in Italy have been historically designed to achieve
strong nominal wage compression.10 Today, national agreements between unions and
employers set wages for each industry and occupational level. Industries are defined
narrowly: For instance, there are currently 34 contracts in the chemical industry, 31 in
textiles, and 39 in food production. Overall, there are 346 national agreements, and they
cover 97.7 per cent of dependent employment in the social security system and 99.3 per
cent of firms.11.
With limited exceptions, Italian firms cannot pay a salary below the level estab-
lished at the national level, irrespective of their specific profitability and product demand
conditions. Thus, despite large geographic differences in productivity, transportation in-
frastructure, geographic location, local public goods, and local government effectiveness
across different areas of the country, firms in a given industry face the same wage floors.12
10Until 1992, it was mainly the centralized indexation of wages to inflation (Scala Mobile) that reduced
nominal wage dispersion across sectors, regions and skill levels. The indexation imposed the same
absolute (as opposed to proportional) salary increase to all employees, independent of their salary. As a
result, wage increases in percent terms were large at the bottom and small at the top of the distribution,
resulting in strong compression over time as described by Erickson and Ichino (1994), Manacorda (2004)
and Garnero (2018)). This mechanism was abolished in 1992, and in 1993 the Italian government, the
national trade unions, and the employers’ associations signed a new income policy agreement which is
still in effect today.
11By definition, national agreements do not include the informal sector.
12In some exceptional circumstances of firms facing particularly severe difficulties, wages lower than
those established at the national level may be allowed. These cases are limited by “opening”, “hardship”
or “inability to pay” clauses to exceptional circumstances such as severe macroeconomic or idiosyncratic
shocks that make downsizing unavoidable. These provisions are rarely invoked before a firm is in severe
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In theory, the system does allow for some wage bargaining at a decentralized level, either
at the firm level or within local industry clusters (“distretti industriali”). In practice,
decentralized bargaining is limited because it is only allowed to increase wages above the
levels set by the national agreements.13
In most cases, wages in national contracts are set close to the market clearing levels
in Northern regions. One reason is that Southern employers are not well represented in
employers associations. Northern regions have a much larger number of firms, especially in
manufacturing, and dominate the process. Confindustria, the main employer association
in manufacturing, collects almost 80 per cent of its revenues in the North and is typically
led by a Northern president.14 By contrast, Southern employers and workers do not often
have the critical mass to have a strong voice in multi-employer bargaining. Empirically,
most Northern provinces are generally close to full employment in a typical non-recession
year, while unemployment is invariably much higher in the South.
In practice, private sector Italian firms do retain a limited degree of wage flexibility.
National contracts allow limited geographic differentiation and some use of merit pay.
In recent years, the use of ”temporary contracts” has allowed to pay a limited number
of employees perv firm wages below national contracts.Firms can also pay employees
under the table. Thus, while one should expect wage compression, one should not expect
nominal wages to be uniformly identical in the private sector. Wages in the public sector
(13.6% of employment in 2015), on the other hand, are nationally uniform; wages of
teachers, doctors, nurses, social security workers, police, and military personnel are the
same in every province for a given job description and level of seniority.15
distress.
13Decentralized bargaining is limited to a small number of large firms, since the wage floors imposed
by the national contracts are typically high for small and medium size firms. In a 1995-96 survey of a
representative sample of 8,000 firms with at least 10 employees in both the manufacturing and service
sectors, only 10 per cent of the firms reported engaging in firm-level bargaining (ISTAT, 2000). Since
then this share has declined (Casadio, 2003, 2008 and Brandolini et al., 2007).
14In terms of timing, employers organizations in the four strongest regions (Lombardia, Piemonte,
Veneto, and Emilia, which are all in the North) typically sign the leading contracts in metalworking,
textiles, chemicals and other manufacturing sectors.
15As a reaction to the strong nominal wage compression imposed by national agreements, the past
few years witnessed an increasing number of so-called “pirate contracts” engineered by a small group of
employers and a labor consultant, involving a ”fake union” created ad-hoc with the purpose of signing the
contract. As long as the contracts are registered at the National Council for Economy and Labor, they
allow subscribing employers to pay lower wage floors than those set by traditional unions and employers’
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Table 3.1 presents an actual example of an Italian wage agreement. The agreement
covers the 2016 construction sector (”Contratto Collettivo Nazionale per i Lavoratori
Edili”). Entries are based on official data released by the Italian Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs and show the degree of permitted labor cost differentiation across provinces
for each specific component of labor costs. The table shows that the main components of
labor costs–for example, the floor and the indexation to inflation–have no cross province
variation, while other components have some cross province variation. The bottom row
shows that, overall, the standard deviation of total labor costs across provinces allowed
by the agreement is only Eur 0.62.
Table 3.2 shows examples of geographic wage variations for two specific private sec-
tor employers and one public sector employer. The previous table referred to a wage
agreement while this table reports wages actually observed in the labor market, but the
picture is similar. The first row shows the median monthly salary at a large national
bank.16 We report the median monthly salary of male bank tellers with 10 to 20 years
of seniority and find limited geographic variability across North, Center and South Italy.
For example, in the Northern city of Milan mean earnings are 1,659 euros per month,
while in the Southern cities of Naples, Palermo .and Bari they are 1,649, 1,677, and
1,670 euros, respectively. In the second row we show corresponding figures for a large
national energy distribution company, inclusive of bonuses and merit pay. In both cases,
we uncover limited geographic differences. If anything, wages in the energy company is
slightly higher in the South, although for confidentiality reasons we cannot report wages
for specific occupations. In the last row we show the salary for an elementary school
teacher with 5 years of seniority. As in the rest of the public sector, there is no variation
in the nominal wage across areas.
These are motivating examples based on three specific cases. In Section 3.5 we will
present more systematic evidence on geographic wage heterogeneity for a representative
sample of Italian workers based on labor survey data.
associations. According to CNEL (2018), about one third of the contracts in its database are subscribed
by unions that are not represented at the Council and 16 belong to unions that have no role in workers’
representation.
16For confidentiality, we cannot reveal the name.
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Germany. Germany offers an interesting counterfactual. Before the Unification of East
and West Germany, the country had a wage-setting system not unlike Italy’s today. The
system was changed after Unification due to the large differences in productivity levels
between the combined regions and the many firms’ threats to walk out of employers’ as-
sociations. In particular, “opening clauses” were enhanced to allow firm-level bargaining
for wages lower than those established at the national level (see Dustmann et al. (2014)
for a discussion of German labor market institutions and their reforms). Opening clauses
enable company management and works council to conclude works agreements which
deviate from the industry-level collective agreement within certain limits. In the chemi-
cal industry, for instance, an opening clause allows companies to reduce the collectively
agreed wage by up to 10 per cent for a limited period of time in order to save jobs or
improve competitiveness.17
More precisely, until the mid-1990s the German system was based on a two-tier bar-
gaining structure. First, industry-wide collective bargaining negotiations between unions
and employer associations took place at the regional (“Lander”) level. One of the regions
was typically pivotal for negotiations in other regions. Then plant-level bargaining took
place, but wages could only increase relative to those established at the regional level.
Since collective agreements were often settled uniformly for the whole industry (with only
minor regional differences), wage differentiation between regions, sectors, and plants was
only achievable if plants paid premiums above the contract wage (Schnabel, 1998).
After German unification, the scope for plant-level bargaining was significantly en-
hanced by allowing for opting-out and derogation clauses from the wage floors established
by higher levels of bargaining. This development was caused by the concern that em-
ployers in the new Eastern regions might leave their respective associations in order to
separately negotiate their labor contracts. The threat of large-scale association downsiz-
ing if less-productive firms in the East had to adopt Western wage floors was a factor in
generating union support for “opening clauses”. Another threat was the possible reloca-
17Trade unions and employer associations retain the right to veto such deviating works agreements.
Sectoral agreements also impose a number of conditions for derogations to apply: companies have to
disclose their financial information allowing workers representatives to have enough time to scrutinize
the financial status of the firm, and the derogation must be temporary.
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tion of firms to neighboring Eastern European countries.
The decline in the importance of collective bargaining and the rise of opening clauses is
quantified in Table 3.3. The ultimate effect of this reform was a significant increase in the
decentralization of wage-setting in Germany. The decline in the importance of industry-
level contracts in Germany after 1995 and the corresponding increase in the importance
of firm-level wage-setting mechanisms have allowed a growing number of German firms
to set wages in line with their productivity.
Other countries. For our purposes, the key difference between the Italian and German
systems is that the latter permits a much wider scope for decentralized bargaining than
the former, allowing wages to vary more as a function of local productivity. An analysis
of the Italian and German bargaining systems has implications not just for Italy and
Germany, but also for other countries. While the specifics of each country labor market
institutions are different, key aspects of the Italian and the German bargaining systems
are present in many other European countries.
Within the OECD, countries with systems closer to Germany’s tend to leave consid-
erable room for firm-level bargaining and/or permit deviations or opt-outs from sectoral
agreements under a broad set of circumstances. OECD (2018b) calls this system “or-
ganized decentralization”. According to the OECD, the group of countries that had a
system of organized decentralization in 2015 includes Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden along with Germany (OECD (2018b)).
By contrast, countries with systems closer to Italy’s are countries where national
industry-level agreements play a dominant role and deviations are either not possible
or only allowed for wage increases relative to sectoral agreements.18 According to the
OECD, this group includes France, Iceland, Portugal, and Slovenia. (OECD (2018b)).
In the wake of the Euro-area crisis, three countries–Spain, Portugal, and (to some
extent) Greece–recently transitioned from a highly-centralized system towards a more
decentralized, German-style model. A comparison of the Italian and German system can
18Sometimes this principle extends beyond pay and includes employment features like hours and annual
leave, which firms can only improve upon from the perspective of employees.
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be informative on the possible effects of these reforms.
More generally, many European countries have a two-tier bargaining structures in
which sector-level bargaining can, in principle, be accompanied by plant-level or local
area bargaining. For example, in Denmark the proportion of firms carrying out two-tier
bargaining more than doubled between 1989 to 1995 (Traxler et al. (2001); Andersen
et al. (2003)). Similarly, the number of Belgian firms involved in both industry and
plant-level agreements increased tenfold from 1980 and the mid 1990s (Van Ruysseveldt
and Visser (1996)). Two-tier bargaining structures are also present in Austria, Finland,
the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (Boeri et al. (2001)).
3.3 Theoretical Framework
Both Italy and Germany have large spatial productivity differences. In Italy, national
contracts limit the ability of local wages to adjust to local productivity, while in Germany
the past two decades of labor market reforms have allowed employers to adjust wages to
local productivity.
In this section, we present a simplified spatial equilibrium model intended to provide
intuition for the effects of the Italian and German wage-setting systems and to guide our
empirical analysis. The model is a standard Rosen-Roback model and is kept deliberately
simple. The main objective is to compare the spatial equilibria under two extreme cases:
(1) local nominal wages can freely adjust to local productivity, and (2) local nominal
wages cannot adjust (due to institutional constraints) but workers and firms are free to
relocate. Rosen-Roback models of spatial equilibria have traditionally focused on the case
of market clearing. The case where the labor market does not clear has not received much
attention (see Kline and Moretti (2013) for an exception where unemployment arises from
search frictions.)
In interpreting the model, two points need to be clear. First, the focus is on geographic
differences. Thus, we abstract from all sources of wage rigidity that are nationwide and
affect all provinces equally. While both Germany and Italy have important labor market
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rigidities of this variety, their effects are clearly outside the scope of this paper.
Second, while the model provides useful extreme benchmarks, it should be clear that
neither Germany nor Italy is exactly described by either of these two extremes. While
German firms have more flexibility to set nominal wages more in line with local produc-
tivity levels, union contracts ensure that this flexibility is not absolute. Similarly, while
Italian firms have more limited flexibility in setting nominal wages, they nevertheless
maintain some scope to adjust wages.
3.3.1 Setup
We consider two regions r = {n, s} that produce a traded good with a price set on the
international market. Production in each region is given by:
Yr = ArK
(1−α)
r E
α
r (3.1)
where Ar denotes TFP; Er is employment and Kr is capital. The two regions are ex-ante
identical with the exception of their level of TFP. We assume that n is more productive
than s due to exogenous historical factors: An ≥ As.
Population of each region is Lr, with the total population of the country L¯ = Ln +Ls
assumed fixed. The utility of a resident of region r is given by:
Ωr =
wr
pσr
(1− ur)δ
where wr is the nominal wage level, pr is the housing price in region r; σ is the
weight of housing in the consumption basket; ur is the non-employment rate in region
r: ur = 1− (Er/Lr).19 We assume that workers can freely move across regions and that
they optimally choose where to live. Specifically, we assume zero mobility costs and no
heterogeneity in taste for location. Thus, in equilibrium it needs to be the case that
workers are indifferent across the two regions: Ωn = Ωs.
20
19For simplicity, we ignore local amenities and assume that workers are renters. Both assumptions can
be relaxed.
20In the case of heterogeneity in taste for location, the marginal worker is indifferent between the two
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Firms optimally choose how many workers to hire and how much capital to use. As in
the standard model, factor demand comes from the first order conditions implying that
the price of each factor must be equal to its marginal product. Capital is supplied to
firms in a region at an increasing price: ir = µ lnKr.
To close the model, we assume that each resident consumes one unit of housing and
that the supply of housing is upward sloping: ln pr = γ lnLr. Put differently, housing
costs are proportional to regional population.
Nominal wages, employment, capital, housing prices, population, and interest rates
in each of the two regions are endogenous: wn, ws, En, Es, Kn, Ks, pn, ps, Ln, Ls, in, is.
3.3.2 Equilibrium When Wages Are Set by Market.
We first consider the standard free market case with flexible wages. The usual condition
that a region’s nominal wage equals the region’s marginal product of labor follows from
firms’ first order conditions:
w∗r = αArK
∗(1−α)
r E
∗−(1−α)
r (3.2)
where the asterisk denotes an equilibrium variable in the free market case. Similarly,
demand for capital in the two regions is determined by the marginal product of capital,
obtained by differentiating Equation 3.1 with respect to K. In equilibrium, the marginal
product of capital equals the rate of return. Given the additional condition that workers
must be indifferent between the two regions, employment, population, capital and housing
prices in the two regions are determined. The resulting equilibrium is the standard Rosen-
Roback equilibrium, which is well understood in the literature. For our purposes, three
features of this equilibrium are worth emphasizing.
First, equilibrium employment, capital and nominal wages are higher in n, which
is the region with higher TFP. This can be seen explicitly by expressing equilibrium
employment, capital and nominal wages as a function of the model exogenous parameters:
locations, so results are qualitatively similar (See Moretti 2010).
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lnE∗n − lnE∗s =
(1 + µ)
σγ(µ+ α) + µ(1− α)(lnAn − lnAs) > 0 (3.3)
lnK∗n − lnK∗s =
(1 + σγ)
σγ(µ+ α) + µ(1− α)(lnAn − lnAs) > 0 (3.4)
lnw∗n − lnw∗s =
(1 + µ)σγ
σγ(µ+ α) + µ(1− α)(lnAn − lnAs) > 0 (3.5)
These three equations make intuitive sense. Since TFP is higher in n, profit-maximizing
firms hire more workers and use more capital in that region. The differences in labor and
capital inputs are proportional to the difference in TFP. The marginal product of labor
is also higher in n, and hence the equilibrium nominal wage is higher, with the regional
wage gap proportional to the gap in TFP.21
Second, housing costs are higher in n because more workers live there in equilibrium:
ln p∗n − ln p∗s =
(1 + µ)γ
σγ(µ+ α) + µ(1− α)(lnAn − lnAs) > 0 (3.6)
The difference in housing costs between the North and the South needs to be large
enough to make workers indifferent between the two regions. This follows from the spatial
equilibrium assumption. As a result, while nominal wages are higher in n in equilibrium,
real wages are equalized in the two regions:
w∗n
p∗σn
=
w∗s
p∗σs
Finally, there is full employment in both regions, since there are no rigidities prevent-
ing the labor market to clear: u∗n = u
∗
s = 0.
3.3.3 Equilibrium When Wages Are Set by National Contract.
We now turn to the case of wage rigidity due to collective bargaining. We assume that a
national contract forces firms to pay the same nominal wage w¯ in the two regions despite
21Since more inputs are used in n, it follows that output is also higher in n: Y ∗n − Y ∗s > 0.
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productivity differences. In particular, we focus for simplicity on the case where nominal
wages are set equal to the market clearing wage in n, and thus above the market clearing
wage in s:
w¯ = w∗n > w
∗
s (3.7)
As discussed in Section 3.2, this is consistent with the typical contract in Italy. Results
are qualitatively similar when nominal wages are set between the market clearing wage
in n and s: w∗n ≥ w¯ ≥ w∗s .
After w¯ is set by the national contract, employment, population, and housing prices
adjust endogenously in the two regions. Non-employment also adjusts endogenously, since
it depends on employment and population. The key difference relative to the free mar-
ket case is that a national contract results in lower equilibrium employment, capital and
output in s. While the wage in s is higher relative to the free market equilibrium, fewer
workers are employed and total national employment declines. As a consequence, aggre-
gate output, aggregate earnings and per-capita income are lower. By imposing a wage in
s that exceeds s’s productivity, the national contract generates spatial misallocation and
causes a national economic loss.
To see this more precisely, consider how firms set employment in this context. The
right hand side of Equation (3.2) still represents the region’s marginal product of labor,
and therefore the labor demand function of firms in that region. But now the region’s
nominal wage is not endogenously determined by the market, and is instead exogenously
set equal to w¯. Firms in each region maximize profits by choosing employment and capital
accordingly.
Just like in the free market case, residents reallocate between n and s until utility is
equalized in the two regions. Thus in equilibrium:
w¯(1− u∗∗n )
p∗∗σn
=
w¯(1− u∗∗s )
p∗∗σs
where the double asterisk denotes an equilibrium variable in the collective bargaining
case. A number of important features of this equilibrium are worth discussing. First, em-
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ployment is lower in s. A comparison with Equation (3.3) indicates that the employment
gap is larger than in the free market case:
lnE∗∗n − lnE∗∗s =
(1 + µ)
µ(1− α)(lnAn − lnAs) > 0 (3.8)
Importantly, unlike in the free market case, now s experiences equilibrium non-employment:
u∗∗s > 0. Intuitively, w¯ is above the market clearing wage in s and non-employment re-
sults from the wedge between the wage and local productivity. In equilibrium, the level
of non-employment in s is proportional to the productivity gap:
u∗∗s =
(1 + µ)σγ
µ(1− α)(σγ + δ)(lnAn − lnAs) > 0 (3.9)
By contrast, n enjoys full employment because w¯ is equal to its market clearing wage.
Second, as in the free market case, housing costs are higher in n since employment
and population are higher there22 But unlike the free market case, real wages are now
lower in n:
w¯
p∗∗σn
− w¯
p∗∗σs
= − (1 + µ)σδγ
µ(1− α)(σγ + δ)(lnAn − lnAs) < 0 (3.10)
This is due to the fact that housing costs are lower in s but nominal wages are the same.
This has the interesting implication that conditional on employment, residents of s are
better off than residents of n. Residents of the s queue to get a job, and those who earn
jobs are better off than their counterparts in n.
Third, in equilibrium firms invest less in s than in n. The gap in the capital stock is
lnK∗∗n − lnK∗∗s =
1
µ(1− α)(lnAn − lnAs) > 0 (3.11)
22In particular: ln p∗∗n − ln p∗∗s = (1+µ)δγµ(1−α)(σγ+δ) (lnAn − lnAs) > 0.
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3.3.4 Aggregate Earning Losses When Wages Are Set by Na-
tional Contract.
We have found that in the fixed wage equilibrium, a fraction of residents in s are not
employed. They optimally choose to stay in the South even if they are idle because if
they were to find a job, the real wage would be higher. While employment is higher in
n in the fixed wage equilibrium compared to free market equilibrium, this is not enough
to offset the employment losses in s. Thus, relative to the free market equilibrium, the
fixed wage equilibrium results in lower aggregate employment in the country.
Moreover, since capital and labor are imperfect substitutes, the stock of capital in s
is also lower in the fixed wage equilibrium. 23 Importantly, the fixed wage equilibrium
also results in lower aggregate output
Y ∗n + Y
∗
s > Y
∗∗
n + Y
∗∗
s (3.12)
If labor demand is elastic, the fixed wage equilibrium also results in lower per capita
earnings
(w∗nE
∗
n) + (w
∗
sE
∗
s )
L¯
>
(w¯E∗∗n ) + (w¯E
∗∗
s )
L¯
(3.13)
To see why, notice that we can rewrite the inequality in Equation 3.13 as
(L¯u∗∗s )w¯ > E
∗
s (w¯ − w∗s) (3.14)
The term (L¯u∗∗s ) on the left-hand side is the employment loss (or the total number of
non-employed) under the fixed wage equilibrium.24 The right hand side – E∗s (w¯ − w∗s)–
is the employment level in s under the free market equilibrium times the wage increase
experienced by workers in s under fixed wages.
This expression can be see graphically in Figure 3.1. Point 1 and 2 are the free
23The equilibrium amount of capital in s is lnK∗∗s =
lnAs+ln(1−α)+α lnE∗∗s
µ+α . Since E
∗∗
s < E
∗
s , it follows
that K∗∗s < K
∗
s .
24The employment loss (L¯u∗∗s )w¯ is smaller than the change in employment in s because under fixed
wages employment in n is higher than under free market.
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market equilibrium and the fixed wage equilibrium in s, respectively. The left hand side
of Equation 3.14 is the area of the rectangles A+C. The right hand side is the area of
the rectangles B + C. Per capita earnings are larger under free market if and only if the
rectangle A is larger than B.
Intuitively, setting the wage above the market wage in s has two effects. On the one
hand it raises the wage that employed workers receive by (w¯−w∗s). On the other it lower
overall employment in the country by an amount defined in Equation (3.9). Figure 3.1
clarifies that per capita earnings are larger if the negative effect of employment losses
(the area of A) exceeds the positive effect from the higher wage (the area of B). The
figure also clarifies that this will be the case if the elasticity of labor demand in region s
is larger than one.25
To sum up: setting the wage above its free market equilibrium in s causes non-
employment, lower investment and lower aggregate output in s. In n, employment and
capital in the fixed wage case are larger than in the free market case, but this only
partially mitigates the aggregate output and earning losses. Overall, the wage rigidity
created by national union contracts has aggregate costs in terms of forgone output and
per capita earnings. In Section 3.6 we will quantify the earning losses in the case of Italy.
3.4 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on data for the labor and housing markets in Italy and
Germany. Employment rates are obtained by the national statistical offices and are for
the group of 15-64 year old. Our wage data for Italy and Germany are from the National
Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT) quarterly labor force statistics and the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB), respectively. They include all private and public employees
for Italy (individual-level wage data for 2009- 2013); and all private and public employees
who are subject to social security contributions for Germany (individual-level wages for
1975-2014). For Italy, housing cost data are from the Osservatorio Mobiliare Italiano and
contain transaction-level data on residential real estate sales in Italy. German housing
25For a small open economy, product demand and therefore labor demand are likely to be elastic.
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data are obtained from the Bundesinstitut fr Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (BBSR),
the regional planning authority in Germany. We obtain data on gross value added for all
industries on the local level from OECD (2018a).
Geographical Unit of Analysis. Choosing a geographic definition of local labor
markets constitutes an important assumption in our study. Ideally, we would like to
use a geographic unit akin to US Metropolitan Statistical Areas or Commuting Zones,
which are small enough to encompass economically-meaningful units but large enough
that most residents both live and work within a single region. Administrative boundaries
of municipalities are likely to be too small; Italian and German workers easily commute
across municipalities. For Italy, our definition of local labor markets is based on 103
provinces, with working-age populations ranging from 76,884 to 3,418,941 and an aver-
age of 495,104. For Germany, we base our definition on 96 ‘Spatial planning regions”
(Raumordnungsregion) with an average working age population of 737,448 and a range
of 187,990 to 3,030,240 in 2010.
In Italy, we define North and South by including in the North the following regions:
Emilia-Romagna, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Lombardia, Marche, Piemonte, Toscana,
Trentino-Alto Adige, Umbria, Valle d’Aosta, Veneto. The South is the everything else.
In Germany, we define West and East based on the historical Cold War division, with
Berlin assigned to East.
Wages and Employment. To account for differences in worker quality and industry
characteristics, for the remainder of this paper we will define wages in a locality as
conditional average wages net of workers’ characteristics (education, age, and gender)
and net of industry effects. Specifically, we regress
wi = α + Ziβ + ui
where wi is the hourly (Italy) or daily (Germany) wage of worker i and Zi contains the
following characteristics: gender, age, age squared, education, and industry. We then
take the average residual of this regression uˆi for every year and province and add the
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average predicted value across provinces for the year 2010 to each province-year residual.
Adding the average 2010 baseline value is useful to maintain the wage levels to be able
to interpret the province level deviations from the mean in their relative magnitude. 26
This procedure produces average wages in each province and year holding constant worker
observable characteristics.
In measuring employment in Italy, a potentially important issue is the existence of
a relatively large informal sector. Since the informal sector is widely understood to be
larger in Southern provinces than in Northern provinces, this has the potential to skew our
findings toward finding smaller employment rates in the South. Our wage data should be
well suited to deal with this issue, since they are from an anonymous survey of workers
and workers have limited incentive to misreport their wages. As for the employment
rate - which is taken from official statistics - we present robustness checks using existing
estimates on informal employment in Italy and find that our results are not very sensitive.
Housing Costs and Local Cost of Living Indexes. We deflate nominal wages
using a measure of local cost of living that takes into account spatial differences in cost
of housing and cost of other non-tradables.
To purge the Italian housing data of possible composition effect we regress
pi = α +Xiβ + ui
where pi is the price per square meter of the housing object and Xi is a set of charac-
teristics including: size category, presence of a balcony, terrace or cellar, condition, floor,
brightness, views, orientation (in terms of cardinal direction), category of the neighbor-
hood, closeness to commercial services, public services, public transport, park or garden,
parking, and whether the municipality is located by the sea or in the mountains (these
last two variables come from ISTAT). As with the wage residuals above, we then average
the housing residuals from this regression by year and province and add them to the
baseline.
26Due to data availability, for Italy, we use hourly wages net of taxes, while for Germany we use daily
wages gross of taxes. Later, we present robustness checks on whether using wages net or gross of taxes
in the two countries matters for the results.
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The German housing data are rent prices collected by the regional planning authority
BBSR from online or newspaper advertisements. To compute prices per square meter,
the BBSR uses non-furnished flats of a size between 40 and 130 sqm in announcements
listed for less than half a year. They filter out implausible prices and luxury flats. We
compute weighted averages by Raumordnungsregion, using weights that reflect the stock
of housing in the area.
To build a local Consumer Price Index (Local CPI) we follow the methodology pro-
posed by Moretti (2013). This measure takes into account that the prices of tradables
may also vary regionally with the price of housing (e.g. a sandwich in Milan costs more
than a sandwich in Palermo). Both countries’ statistical offices provide regional measures
of CPI that cannot be used for geographic comparisons as they are normalized to 1 in a
given year. Nevertheless, they are useful in understanding whether and to what degree
the prices of housing and other goods move together. Regressing the overall change in
CPI for a province on the change of its housing component, we find the proportion of
tradables’ price changes that vary with housing prices. Using this, we can construct a
CPI that is a reasonable measure of the geographic differences in prices that consumers
face in all their goods. 27
Productivity. To our knowledge, the only measure of firm productivity available at a
fine geographic level in Italy and Germany is gross value-added per worker. Gross value
added is output valued (through capital and labour) at basic prices less intermediate
consumption valued at purchasers prices. The basic price is the amount receivable by
the producer from the purchaser for a unit of a product or service minus any tax on the
product plus any subsidy on the product. Gross value added per worker in each province
is obtained by dividing this measure by employment in that province. We obtain data on
27Specifically, local CPIpt is defined as CPIpt = ωHPpt + (1−ω)NHPpt where HPpt is housing price
in province p and year t, NHPpt is the price of non housing or non tradables and (ω) is the housing
weight. Some part of NHP varies with the housing price so that NHP = piHP + ν. Therefore when we
regress ∆CPIpt on ∆HPpt, β = (ω + (1 − ω)pi). Then, we use ω to compute: pi = β−ωn1−ωn . We then use
the province specific housing prices obtained through our own calculations and construct the local CPI
as:
CPIpt = ωHPpt + (1− ω) [piHPpt + (1− pi)NHPt]
The housing weight in consumption ω is obtained from the statistical office Destatis. For Italy we use
consumption weights from Households consumption surveys from 2005-2011.
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gross value added per worker for all industries on the local level from OECD (2018a)28
Table 3.4 shows summary statistics of all variables.
3.5 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we first document the degree of productivity differences across provinces in
Italy and Germany (subsection 3.5.1). We then turn to wages, studying the relationship
between nominal wages and local productivity (subsection 3.5.2). Third, we study the
relationship between non-employment rates and local productivity (subsections 3.5.3)
and the relationship between real wages and local productivity (subsection 3.5.4).
3.5.1 Value Added
Mean value-added per worker across provinces is Eur 54,837 in Italy and Eur 52,901
in Germany, but these means mask vast geographic differences across provinces in both
countries. The maps in the top panel of Figure 3.2 show value-added per worker in Italy
(left panel) and Germany (right panel) in 2010. Throughout the paper, all maps are in
percent deviations from the unweighted national mean. In Italy, productivity appears
higher in the North than in the South. In Germany, it is higher in the West than in the
East.
The bottom panel in Figure 3.2 shows the spatial distribution of value-added in the
two countries in the same year. Two features of this figure are important. First, the
differences in productivity across regions are quite similar in Italy and Germany, with
the bulk of the distribution between -20% and 20% in both countries with respect to the
country mean. The range, 90-10 percentile difference and 75-25 percentile difference of
deviations from the country mean are, respectively, 57.79%, 27.92% and 17.95% in Italy
and 70.47.72%, 39.92% and 17.65% in Germany. This level of geographic heterogeneity
in productivity is not atypical among industrialized countries and it is not unlike what
we see, for example, in the US. 29
28This measure has been used by Hall and Jones (1999).
29The 90-10 percentile and 75-25 percentile difference in manufacturing log TFP across metropolitan
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Second, while there is some overlap, it is clear from the figure that in Italy Northern
provinces are vastly more productive than Southern provinces, and in Germany Western
provinces are more productive than Eastern provinces. Interestingly, the differences are
comparable in the two countries: the difference between the mean province in Northern
and Southern Italy in 2010 is 17.6%, while the difference between the mean province in
West and East Germany is 22.7%.
We stress that in this paper, we take these differences as given; our analysis focuses
on the effects of these differences rather than their causes. As we discuss above, in Italy,
North-South differences reflect historical differences in many determinants of regional
productivity, including transportation infrastructure, distance from European markets,
efficiency of local governments and local policies, criminal activity, and cultural norms.
These differences are long lasting and largely determined by historical factors. In Ger-
many, East-West differences likely reflect half a century of Communist rule in the East
as well as other historical factors. While it is in principle possible to model endogenous
regional differences in the long run, such models are outside the scope of this paper.
3.5.2 Nominal Wages
The map in the top panel of Figure 3.3 shows the spatial distribution of nominal wages
in the two countries, drawn using the same scale. The main feature to notice is that
the distribution is more compressed in Italy than in Germany: while there is geographic
wage heterogeneity in Italy, it is significantly smaller than in Germany. The wage bar-
gaining system in the two countries likely partially explains this regional heterogeneity.
Conditional on worker characteristics, the wage difference between North and the South
in Italy is only 4.2%, while the West-East difference in Germany is seven times larger at
28.2%.
The difference between Italy and Germany is seen more clearly in the bottom panel
of Figure 3.3, which shows the spatial distribution across provinces in the two countries.
The mass of the distribution in Italy is between -10% and 10% of the country mean,
statistical areas are .71 and .59 in the US in 2000 (Hornbeck and Moretti (2018)).
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while in Germany it is between -26% and 22%. In 2010, the 75-25 percentile difference
and 90-10 percentile difference were 5.8% and 10.3% in Italy and 13.1% and 42.9% in
Germany. The amount of spatial wage dispersion in Germany is lower than what we see
in the US, but not by much. By contrast, the amount of spatial wage dispersion in Italy
is much lower.
Note that wages are by no means completely uniform across Italian provinces despite
national wage contracts at the industry level. There are three reasons for this. First, recall
that nationwide contracts offer a wage floor, and while the floor is binding in most cases,
firms are free to (and sometimes do) offer higher wages. Temporary contracts offer some
additional degree of wage flexibility, although their number is limited by law. Second,
some workers are paid under the table. In this case, of course, nationwide contracts are
ignored, but our wage data should include these cases, as discussed above. Third, there
are data limitations. National contracts specify a given wage for a given occupation and
level of seniority in the firm. While we control for a worker work experience, as standard
in wage regressions, we do not directly observe seniority. Our occupational categories are
not as fine as those used in union contracts.
Overall, while there is some geographical nominal wage dispersion in Italy, it is clear
from Figure 3.3 that nominal wage dispersion is empirically much more pronounced in
Germany.
In this study, the key empirical relationship is that between local productivity and
local nominal wages. If wages can fully adjust, our model indicates that we should
see a tight relationship between the two, with provinces that enjoy higher productivity
having higher nominal wages. This is indeed the case in the US (Hornbeck and Moretti,
2018). By contrast, if wages are prevented from fully adjusting, we should see a weaker
relationship or none at all.
Figure 3.4 presents scatter plots that document the relation between the log condi-
tional mean nominal wage by province on the y-axis and log mean value-added on the
x-axis in 2010. Consistent with institutional differences in wage setting mechanisms, Ger-
man firms are significantly more able to adjust nominal wages to local productivity than
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Italian firms. Due to nationwide contracts, there appears to be a significant wedge in
Italy between wages and marginal product of labor. Table 3.5 show the corresponding
regression coefficients in a model including years 2000-2014 for Germany and 2009-2013
for Italy. Columns 1 and 4 show that in a regression of log conditional mean nominal wage
on log mean value-added the elasticity of nominal wages with respect to local value-added
is 0.19 and 0.73 across the whole country in Italy and Germany, respectively. In other
words, the elasticity is almost four times larger in Germany than in Italy. In columns 2,
3 and 5, 6 we show the same coefficients within each of the macro areas. Wages remain
strongly correlated with differences in productivity even when eliminating the variation
between East and West in Germany. This means that what we are observing is not a
pattern between East and West only but a more general flexibility of the German wage
setting institutions. In Italy, within the South the correlation between wages and pro-
ductivity is statistically indistinguishable from zero at a 95% confidence level. The North
displays a similar small correlation with productivity as the country overall. This is con-
sistent with the idea that national bargaining contracts tend to cater to Northern firms
(leaving the North relatively less contrained) while strongly constraining wage setting in
the South of Italy.30
Overall, we find that despite large productivity differences across provinces, Italy’s
wage-setting mechanism results in nominal wages that are generally compressed across
space. Crucially, there is little or no correlation between mean productivity in a province
and mean nominal wages. By contrast, Germany has more nominal wage dispersion.
Although Germany has the same amount of productivity difference across provinces, the
absence of binding national wage contracts allows wages to better adjust to local labor
market conditions.
30A similar point is made in Table 3.6. In the first row, we regress individual level log wages on workers
characteristics: sex, age, age squared, education and the industry. Entries in the table refer to the R2.
In the second row, we add province fixed effects. In Italy, the R2 increases only marginally, from 0.35 to
0.36. By contrast, in Germany the R2 increases significantly more, from 0.39 to 0.46. This suggests that
despite large productivity differences across provinces, local factors play a minimal role in explaining
individual level wage variation in Italy, and a larger role in Germany.
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3.5.3 Probability of Non-Employment
Our model predicts that in Italy, where wages cannot adjust fully, provinces with low pro-
ductivity should have higher non-employment rates. This should be less true in Germany,
where wages can adjust more to local productivity.
Empirically, this is indeed the case. The maps in the top panel of Figure 3.5 show rates
of non-employment in Italy and Germany, by province. This difference between the two
countries is more clear in bottom panel of Figure 3.5, which shows the spatial distribution
of non-employment rates in the two countries. In Italy there is almost no overlap between
the North and the South in non-employment rates. By contrast, despite equally large
spatial productivity differences, the East-West differences in non-employment rates are
much smaller. Indeed, the distribution for West Germany and East Germany overlap
almost completely.
Figure 3.6 shows the relation between the log non-employment rate and log mean
value-added for 2010. Unsurprisingly, the elasticity of non-employment with respect to
value-added appears negative in both countries, indicating that provinces with lower
value-added have higher non-employment. Consistent with our model, the elasticity
appears significantly larger for Italy than Germany. Put differently, in Italy, areas with
low mean value added have much higher non-employment rates than areas with high
mean value added. In Germany, where nominal wages can adjust to local value added,
the difference in non-employment rates is smaller.
Table 3.7 shows the corresponding coefficients in a model including years 2001-2015
for Germany and 2004-2015 for Italy. In a regression of local non-employment rates
on local value-added, we find a significantly larger coefficient for Italy than Germany.
In particular, comparing column 1 with column 4, we see that the elasticity in Italy is
almost six times larger in absolute value. As we restrict ourselves to within macro area
variation, we can see that a strong correlation between productivity and non-employment
remains intact within each macro region in Italy. In Germany, this correlation drops to
zero within the East and to a small value within the West.
One plausible concern is that the relatively large informal sector in Italy could bias
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our findings. We probe the robustness of our findings by replicating both Figure 3.5 and
Table 3.7 using an alternative measure of employment. This measure is based on ISTAT
estimates of the proportion of irregular work among all full-time equivalent units of work.
We use this measure to inflate the employment rate in each province proportionally to
the estimated informal sector.31 The results are shown in Figure 3.7 and Table 3.8. They
indicate that the relative larger presence of informal work in the South is unlikely to
generate large differences with respect to our main results.
3.5.4 Cost of Living and Real Wages
Figure 3.8 and 3.9 show the spatial distribution of housing prices and overall cost of
living (local CPI) in the two countries. Recall that geographic differences in overall cost
of living reflect both the cost of housing and the cost of other non-tradables, with most of
the spatial variation coming from the cost of housing. Housing prices and cost of living
are higher in North Italy and West Germany, with the geographic differences slightly
more pronounced in Italy.
Figure 3.10 shows real wages, defined as nominal wages deflated by the index of local
cost of living. The comparison between nominal wages in Figure 3.3 and real wages in
Figure 3.10 is striking. It indicates that real wages in many provinces of the South of
Italy are significantly higher than the country mean, despite having low productivity. In
Germany the same inversion does not occur. This is consistent with the predictions of
our model.
Table 3.9 quantifies the North-South and West-East differences in nominal and real
wages. Columns 1 and 3 show the nominal wage difference between North-South (column
1) and West-East (column 3), after conditioning on workers characteristics. Despite the
fact that productivity differences are similar in the two countries, the difference in nominal
wages is much smaller in Italy than in Germany because wages cannot fully adjust in Italy.
Columns 2 and 4 show the corresponding real wage difference. Consistent with our model,
the difference in real wages becomes negative in Italy, indicating that on average, real
31In particular, we inflate the official employment rate by a factor 11−einf where einf is the share of
work estimated to be done in the informal sector.
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wages are higher in the South.32
Figure 3.11 presents the province-level relationship between log real wages and log
value-added. In Italy, there is a negative relationship, indicating that the most productive
provinces tend to have the lowest real wage. In Germany, the relationship is positive.
This finding is striking. Southern Italian provinces are characterized by lower nominal
wages but higher real wages as a result of relatively low housing prices and cost of living.
As a result, employed Italians are better off living in the South than the North because
they have a higher real wage. However, non-employment is higher in the South. Southern
jobs are essentially rationed, with residents standing in line waiting to get one. If they
succeed, their real wage is higher than in the North. This implies an inefficient spatial
allocation of resources and possibly large economic costs in terms of forgone earnings and
forgone employment.
In Germany the spatial equilibrium is different. Because nominal wages are more
flexible, there are smaller differences in non-employment rates across regions.
Figure 3.12 shows the relationship between nominal and real wages across local areas
in 2010. It shows that nominal wages were strongly dispersed in Germany but very
compressed in Italy. In Germany, the correlation between real and nominal wages is
visible. In Italy, real wages differ considerably but favor the South.
3.6 Aggregate Costs of Spatial Misallocation
Our model in Section 3.3 has shown that the wage rigidity induced by national union con-
tracts has aggregate costs in terms of forgone aggregate earnings and forgone employment.
In this Section we estimate the aggregate costs stemming from spatial misallocation in
Italy.
Intuitively, under the current wage setting system, firms in provinces where productiv-
32One difference between the two countries in terms of data is that the wages we use for Italy are net
of taxes. Given a progressive tax scheme, taxes could compress wages and thus exaggerate the patterns
we are pointing to in this paper. To adjust for this we use the mean wage of all full time workers
in social security records (INPS) gross and net of taxes (from 2015) to generate a net/gross ratio for
every province. We then construct the net/gross corrected wages dividing the net ISTAT wage of every
province by the net/gross ratio for every province. The results base based on corrected wages are in the
Table 3.10. The correction does not change our findings.
98
ity is low are forced to pay wages above the local market-clearing level. As a consequence,
output and employment in those provinces are below what they could be if wages were
flexible. If nominal wages were allowed to reflect local productivity, output and em-
ployment in low-productivity provinces would increase, resulting in an overall increase in
national aggregate output and aggregate employment. This could happen if, for example,
union contracts were negotiated at the provincial level instead of the national level.
Italian aggregate and per capita earnings would likely increase as well. More specifi-
cally, our model shows that total and per capita earnings would increase if the elasticity
of labor demand in the traded sector is larger than one. Intuitively, in low-productivity
provinces wages would decrease relative to the current status quo. But an elastic labor
demand implies that the increase in local employment would be proportionally larger
than the decline in wages, insuring a positive effect on aggregate earnings. Labor de-
mand in the traded sector is likely to be elastic in the case of a small open economy like
Italy, fully integrated in European continental product markets.
As a result, allowing union contracts to be negotiated at the provincial level would
improve efficiency, which would likely increase GDP, total employment, aggregate earn-
ings and per capita labor income. It would also have some distributional consequences,
in the sense that it would generates winner and losers relative to the status quo. The
main losers would be currently-employed workers in the South, as they would face lower
nominal and real wages.
To quantify the magnitude of these effects, we provide estimates from two counter-
factual exercises. The two exercises are similar in that they both relax wage rigidity by
allowing some local wages to depend on local productivity. They differ in how tight the
link between local wages and local productivity is allowed to be.
In the first counterfactual scenario, we assume that wages in each province are allowed
to fully adjust to local productivity. That is, we assume that if one province is 10% less
productive than another,then its wages are 10% lower. This is indeed the case in the
standard market-clearing case, as can be seen by the first order conditions in equation
3.2. It’s a useful benchmark, but is not necessarily realistic in a European context.
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In the second counterfactual, we assume that the relationship between wages and
productivity and the one between employment and productivity are the same as those
observed in Germany. Crucially, we do not assume that the average wages or average
employment in Italy would be the same as in Germany, nor are we constraining produc-
tivity to be similar. Instead, we assume that if in Germany provinces with 10% higher
productivity pay wages that are x% higher, the same would true for Italy, whatever the
productivity level in each Italian province. For conservative estimates on the changes in
the employment rate, we use the employment rate corrected for informal employment as
described in section 3.5.3 as a baseline for Italy.
We caution that while the empirical results in the previous section were estimated
exclusively from data, the quantification of aggregate losses naturally relies on some
assumptions. The estimated effects should therefore be considered as an attempt to
assess their order of magnitude, rather than as exact figures.
3.6.1 Assumptions
As we argued in Section 3.2, the current Italian nationwide contracts can be thought of
as setting wages approximately equal to the market-clearing level in the North. Corre-
spondingly, in our main set of counterfactuals we assume that, in the status quo, wages
are set to clear the labor market of the median province in the North. We denote the pro-
ductivity, wage, and employment rate of the median province in the North as GV Amax,
ωmax and emax, respectively. In the data, the corrected employment rate in this province
is 71.23% vs. 66.99% on average over all provinces. The median wage is 8.7 Euros per
hour, compared to the 8.5 Euro median across all provinces.
To probe the robustness of our findings with respect to this assumption, later we also
try different variants using the median of the top 5, 10 or 20 provinces in the North in
terms of productivity.
Scenario 1: The counterfactual wages and employment in this scenario are based on the
assumption that wages in provinces outside the North are allowed to fully adjust to
local productivity. In practice, this means that for each province outside the North, we
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calculate the percent difference between local productivity (GV Ap) and productivity of
the North (GV Amax): δp =
GV Amax−GV Ap
GV Amax
. We then compute counterfactual wages in a
province as ω∗p1 = (1− δp)ωmax, where ωmax is the median wage of the target. Similarly,
we compute the counterfactual employment rate as: e∗p1 = emax. The counterfactual wage
and employment for provinces in the North are kept equal to those observed in the data.
Scenario 2: In this scenario, we assume that the relationship between Italian wages and
productivity is equal to the relationship between German wages and productivity. Ac-
cordingly, we estimate βω, the coefficient from a OLS regression of log wage level on log
value-added by provinces Germany. The coefficient corresponds to the one in Table 3.5,
and is equal to .74. We also assume that the relationship between Italian employment
and productivity is the same as the relationship between German employment and pro-
ductivity, calculating βe as the coefficient of a regression of log employment rate on log
value-added in Germany. It is equal to .25.
The counterfactual wage is defined as ω∗p2 = (1− βωδp)ωmax and the counterfactual
employment rate is e∗p2 = (1− βeδp) emax. As in Scenario 1, the counterfactual wage and
employment for provinces in the North are kept equal to those observed in the data. For
both scenarios the expected hourly wage per province is the wage ω times the employment
probability e.
3.6.2 Results
Our main findings are in Table 3.11, which reports the resulting changes in employment
and aggregate earnings. Letting nominal wages in each province fully adjust to local
productivity (Scenario 1) would decrease hourly pay by 9.20% on average–or 77 cents an
hour–in Southern provinces. We estimate that these changes would increase employment
by 26.62% (about 14 percentage points) in the South, raising income for the average
Southern worker, whether employed or not, by 13.86 %. For the country as a whole this
increase would amount to a 11.95% increase in employment, corresponding to about 2.5
million additional jobs in the Southern provinces and to an average increase of about 500
euros of yearly income per working-age person in Italy.
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If the geographic differences in the gap between productivity and nominal wages in
Italy where set equal to those in Germany instead (Scenario 2), Southern hourly wages
would decrease by 5.9% (that is 52 cents), Southern employment would increase by 24.6%,
and per capita income would increase by 16.59% in the South and 7.45% across the
country.
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 show the geographic dispersion of the percentage change of
wages and employment from status quo to counterfactual for both scenarios.
Table 3.12 shows the counterfactual results using the uncorrected employment rate
(not accounting for informal work). These results therefore also account for shifts from
informal to formal employment. Table 3.13 repeats the counterfactual calculations for the
case in which we use the median of the top 5 provinces in the North as the current wage
baseline. In this case, average wages in Southern provinces would decrease by 11.41%
to 16.96%, depending on the scenario, while Southern employment would increase by
24.8% to 28.05%. Aggregate earnings in the South would increase by 5.61% to 10.18%,
and nationwide aggregate employment would increase by 11.8% to 13.74% and aggregate
earnings would increase by 0.69% to 3.35%. Tables 3.14 and 3.15 show the results for
the cases in which we use the top 10 and 20 top provinces of the North as our status quo
productivity baseline.
It is obvious that these back-of-the-envelope calculations are based on rather coarse
assumptions and that they are unlikely to be realized in the short run even if flexibilization
does take place. Nevertheless, even if - as in Scenario 2 - we allow for a reasonable but
persistent relationship between productivity and employment, employment in the South
would increase substantially. The purpose of these counterfactual exercises it simply to
highlight the existence of potentially large gains in terms of equity and efficiency deriving
from a liberalization of wage bargaining across different localities. The costs originating
from spatial misallocation in Italy appear to be substantial.
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3.7 Conclusions
Centralized wage bargaining systems are common in Europe and have traditionally re-
ceived substantial attention in the economic literature. But their effects on the geography
of employment and wages and their aggregate costs have not previously been studied.
In this paper, we study the local and aggregate effects of national wage bargaining
systems by comparing the spatial distribution of wages, non-employment rates, cost of
housing, and real wages in Italy and Germany. The two countries have a similar spatial
distribution of firm productivity, but have adopted different models of wage bargaining.
Italy sets wages based on nationwide sectoral contracts that allow for minimal local wage
adjustments, while Germany has moved toward a more flexible system that allows for
local bargaining.
We find that, as a consequence, the spatial distribution of nominal wages is very
compressed in Italy, and the the relationship between local productivity and local nominal
wages is weak or possibly zero. By contrast, Germany has significantly more spatially-
dispersed wages and a much tighter link between wages and local productivity.
These wage rigidities generate economically costly inefficiencies in Italy. We find that
provinces with low productivity have significantly higher non-employment rates than
provinces with high productivity, because employers in low productivity provinces cannot
lower wages and end up hiring fewer workers.
Notably, we also uncover a negative relationship between real wages and local value-
added in Italy. Despite having higher productivity, the North has lower real wages than
the South, since the latter has low housing costs but similar nominal wages. This means
that, conditional on having a job, a Italian worker is better off in the South in terms of
purchasing power. However, the probability of having a job is higher in the North. Thus,
national wage contracts have created a spatial equilibrium where workers queue for jobs
in the South and remain unemployed while waiting. By contrast, in Germany real wages
in the West are not significantly lower than in the East, since nominal wages are spatially
more flexible.
From a macro-economic point of view, we find that the Italian wage bargaining system
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generates significant economic costs in terms of forgone aggregate earnings and employ-
ment. If nominal wages were allowed to reflect local productivity, aggregate employment
and aggregate earnings would significantly increase in Italy. Based on reasonable as-
sumptions, we estimate that aggregate Southern employment could increase by about 14
percentage points. Aggregate earnings in the South would increase by 13.86% to 16.59%.
Nationwide, we estimate that aggregate employment would increase by 11.04% to 11.95%
or about 2.5 million jobs, and aggregate earnings would increase by 6.22% to 7.45%. In
per capita terms, this amounts to around 500-600 euros per capita per year across all
working-age adults, not just the employed. These could be the potential gains if Italy
adopted a system similar to Germany’s, where union contracts can be negotiated at the
firm or local level instead of the national level.
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Appendix: Tables
Table 3.1: Example of a Collective Bargaining Contract in Italy: Construction Sector,
2016
Cost component Mean Min Max SD
Minimum/Floor 4.86 4.86 4.86 0.00
Indexation to inflation 2.96 2.96 2.96 0.00
Cost of living allowance 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00
Variable component of pay 0.15 0.04 0.50 0.09
Sectoral allowance 1.11 0.91 1.26 0.07
Total : Hourly components of pay 9.02 8.79 9.37 0.09
Remuneration for national holidays 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.00
Compensation for yearly vacation 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.01
Contribution to mutual sectoral fund 1.77 1.73 1.80 0.01
Transport allowance 0.29 0.05 1.40 0.20
Compensation for training 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.00
Contribution to mutual fund for injury 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.00
Total : Additional costs 3.46 3.19 4.64 0.21
Contribution to social security 4.38 4.23 4.78 0.09
Contribution to accident insurance 1.62 1.57 1.77 0.03
Contribution to special contruction worker fund 0.78 0.39 1.16 0.15
Total : Social security and accident insurance 6.78 6.34 7.57 0.23
Allowance for meals 0.60 0.12 1.75 0.26
Severance 0.98 0.92 1.39 0.05
Mobility allowance, complemenatary allowances 3.20 3.13 3.25 0.02
Contribution to pension fund 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00
Total average hourly cost of labor 24.08 22.98 26.04 0.62
Note: This table shows statistics about the May 2016 dispersion across provinces of the components of the compensation
for workers in “level 1” of the bargaining agreement for the construction sector (“Contratto Collettivo Nazionale per i
Lavoratori Edili”). Monetary figures are in Euros.
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Table 3.2: Median Monthly Wages at Three Employers
Median North Median Center Median South
Private sector: Bank teller 1,666 1,667 1,664
Private sector: Energy company 2,736 2,923 2,931
Public sector: Elementary school teacher 1,305 1,305 1,305
Note: This table shows the median wage for employees working for the same employer with similar seniority and qualification
in three macro Italian areas. In the first row, we show the monthly wage for a male bank teller with 10-20 years of experience
in a large Italian bank, at level 6 of the internal hierarchy (“Inquadramento unico: impiegato”; the data come from Ichino
and Maggi, 2000). The sample size is 423, 140, and 105 individuals for the North, Center, and South respectively. The
second row shows the mean wages of a large company in the energy sector operating in almost all Italian provinces. We
include men with less than 10 years of experience and with a permanent full-time contract. The sample size is 91, 64 and
130 individuals for the North, Center, and South respectively. In the third row we show the wages of elementary school
teachers with 5 years of seniority.
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Table 3.3: Percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining and opening clauses -
Germany
Year % workers under % workers subject to
industry contract opening clauses
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West East West East
1996 69.22 56.30 . .
1998 67.77 50.46 . .
2001 63.11 44.60 . .
2003 62.08 42.58 . .
2005 58.74 41.89 33.36 23.69
2007 56.18 40.57 38.30 28.19
2009 55.46 38.35 . .
2011 53.70 37.44 47.27 40.01
2013 52.03 35.13 . .
Note: This table shows the coverage of union contracts and opening clauses (”exceptions to union contracts - on wage or
hours”). The data are obtained from a linked employer-employee dataset of the IAB - Institute for Employment Research.
The figures in this table show the fraction of workers working for an employer who states to apply industry contracts or to
use opening clauses respectively.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics - 2010
Germany Mean SD N
Value added per worker 52901 8134 96
CPI 100.0 14.18 96
Housing price 100.0 18.53 96
Nominal wage 91.6 11.25 96
Real wage 92.3 10.76 96
Non-empl rate 27.9 3.59 96
Italy
Value added per worker 54837 6227 103
CPI 100.0 16.19 103
Housing price 100.0 25.17 103
Nominal wage 8.5 0.44 103
Nominal wage - net/gross corrected 12.0 0.74 103
Real wage 8.8 1.47 103
Real wage - net/gross corrected 12.3 1.96 103
Non-empl rate 42.5 9.58 103
Non-empl rate corrected 34.0 7.55 103
Note: Value-added is computed across all industries in the geographic area in question, as calculated by the OECD
(Germany) and ISTAT (Italy), and it is divided by employment in that area. Housing prices are average prices for a square
meter with similar characteristics in each area. The CPI is constructed using those housing prices according to the method
describes in section 3.4. Nominal wages are average wages controlling for individual characteristics such as age, education,
gender, and industry. In Italy these are hourly wages net of taxes, in Germany daily wages gross of taxes. Real wages
are deflated using Local CPI. Non-employment refers to the number of people age 15-64 out of employment over the total
population of that age group.
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Table 3.5: Regression of Mean Nominal Wages on Mean Value-Added
Italy Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All South only North only All East only West only
Log value added 0.195 0.0635 0.215 0.736 0.557 0.358
(0.013) (0.033) (0.023) (0.013) (0.027) (0.008)
Provinces: 103 103 103 96 96 96
Note: Entries are the coefficients of mean log value-added in a regression of mean nominal log wage on mean log value-added
pooling all years 2000-2014 (Germany) and 2009-2013 (Italy). The regression contains year fixed effects.
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Table 3.6: R2 from a Regression of Individual Wages on Worker Characteristics, Industry
and Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2)
Italy Germany
Without province FE .352 .389
With province FE .36 .463
Difference .008 .074
Note: the table reports the R2 of a regression of individual wages on the same characteristics as above, industry and year
fixed effects. Province fixed effects are then included and the R2 is compared. The change in R2 when including the
province fixed effects is almost zero in Italy while it is almost 20% in Germany. Here we use data from 2009-2013 (Italy)
and for 1992-2014 (Germany).
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Table 3.7: Regression of Non-Employment Rate on Mean Value Added
Italy Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All South only North only All East only West only
Log value added -1.434 -0.658 -0.405 -0.252 0.0437 -0.117
(0.030) (0.053) (0.036) (0.024) (0.063) (0.035)
Provinces: 103 103 103 96 96 96
Note: Entries are the coefficients on mean value-added in a regression of the log non-employment rate among the 15-64
year olds on mean log value-added pooling all years 2001-2015 (Germany) and 2004-2015 (Italy). The regression contains
year fixed effects.
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Table 3.8: Regression of Corrected Non-Employment Rate on Mean Value Added
Italy
(1) (2) (3)
All South only North only
Log value added -1.259 -0.387 -0.432
(0.042) (0.085) (0.058)
Provinces: 103 103 103
Note: Entries are the coefficients on mean value-added in a regression of the ”corrected” log non-employment rate among
the 15-64 year olds on mean log value-added pooling all years 2001-2015 (Germany) and 2004-2015 (Italy). The regression
contains year fixed effects.
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Table 3.9: Average Wage Differences
North - South West - East
in Italy in Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nominal real nominal real
% Difference 0.0425 -0.0921 0.282 0.176
(0.003) (0.017) (0.003) (0.007)
Year FE: Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provinces: 103 103 96 96
Note: This table reports the coefficient of a regression of conditional mean log wages on an indicator of north/west. We pool
all available years. For nominal wages 2000-2014 (Germany) and 2009-2013 (Italy). For real wages 2004-2014 (Germany)
and 2009-2011 (Italy). The regression contains year fixed effects.
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Table 3.10: Nominal and Real Wages Corrected For Taxes
North - South
Uncorrected Corrected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nominal real nominal - corr real - corr
% Difference 0.0425 -0.0921 0.0717 -0.0629
(0.003) (0.017) (0.004) (0.017)
Year FE: Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provinces: 103 103 103 103
Note: Because wages in Istat are net of taxes, we use the mean wage of all full time workers in INPS gross and net to
generate a net/gross ratio for every province. We then generate corrected wages dividing the net Istat wage of every
province by the net/gross ratio for every province. The table shows the coefficient of a regression of conditional nominal
and real wage on an indicator of north using the uncorrected and corrected wages respectively.
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Table 3.11: Counterfactual Scenarios
South North Total
Average hourly wage: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 8.36 8.68 8.54
Scenario 1 7.56 -9.20 8.68 0.00 8.18 -4.13
Scenario 2 7.84 -5.90 8.68 0.00 8.30 -2.65
Employment rate: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 57.32 71.00 64.86
Scenario 1 71.24 26.62 71.00 0.00 71.11 11.95
Scenario 2 70.17 24.60 71.00 0.00 70.63 11.04
Monthly income per capita: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 766.63 986.68 887.89
Scenario 1 861.44 13.86 986.68 0.00 930.46 6.22
Scenario 2 881.00 16.59 986.68 0.00 939.24 7.45
Note: This table shows the counterfactual wage, employment and income levels by Macro area. Wages are in Euros per
hour, employment rate in % of the 15-64 year olds. The employment rate is corrected for informal work as described in
section 3.5.3. The labor income per capita is constructed multiplying the average full-time monthly earnings (assuming
160 working hours per month) in Euros with the employment rate and thus the probability of being in employment. The
table also shows the average % changes across provinces between the actual and projected value of each variable. The
counterfactual in Scenario 1 reflects a reduction of wages by the percent difference in mean value-added to the median
of Northern provinces and an employment rate equal to the median of Northern provinces in all provinces. Scenario 2
adjusts wages according to the relationship between productivity and wages in Germany as well as employment according
to the relationship between productivity and employment in Germany. Note that the benchmark group (ie. the Northern
provinces) are not adjusted. Averages are weighted by working age population.
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Table 3.12: Counterfactual Scenario - Uncorrected Employment Rate
South North Total
Average hourly wage: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 8.36 8.68 8.54
Scenario 1 7.56 -9.20 8.68 0.00 8.18 -4.13
Scenario 2 7.84 -5.90 8.68 0.00 8.30 -2.65
Employment rate: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 47.02 64.69 56.76
Scenario 1 64.43 40.74 64.69 0.00 64.57 18.29
Scenario 2 63.46 38.43 64.69 0.00 64.14 17.25
Monthly income per capita: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 628.16 899.25 777.56
Scenario 1 779.13 25.88 899.25 0.00 845.33 11.62
Scenario 2 796.82 28.99 899.25 0.00 853.27 13.01
Note: This table shows the counterfactual wage, employment and income levels by Macro area. Wages are in Euros per
hour, employment rate in % of the 15-64 year olds. The employment rate is not corrected for informal work as described
in section 3.5.3. The labor income per capita is constructed multiplying the average full-time monthly earnings (assuming
160 working hours per month) in Euros with the employment rate and thus the probability of being in employment. The
table also shows the average % changes across provinces between the actual and projected value of each variable. The
counterfactual in Scenario 1 reflects a reduction of wages by the percent difference in mean value-added to the median
of Northern provinces and an employment rate equal to the median of Northern provinces in all provinces. Scenario 2
adjusts wages according to the relationship between productivity and wages in Germany as well as employment according
to the relationship between productivity and employment in Germany. Note that the benchmark group (ie. the Northern
provinces) are not adjusted. Averages are weighted by working age population.
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Table 3.13: Counterfactual Scenarios - Variant 2: Top 5 provinces
South North Total
Average hourly wage: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 8.36 8.68 8.54
Scenario 1 6.92 -16.96 8.23 -5.24 7.64 -10.50
Scenario 2 7.38 -11.41 8.39 -3.38 7.94 -6.99
Employment rate: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 57.32 71.00 64.86
Scenario 1 71.95 28.05 72.41 2.08 72.20 13.74
Scenario 2 70.17 24.80 71.80 1.21 71.07 11.80
Monthly income per capita: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 766.63 986.68 887.89
Scenario 1 795.03 5.61 953.35 -3.31 882.28 0.69
Scenario 2 828.53 10.18 963.96 -2.22 903.16 3.35
Note: This table shows the counterfactual wage, employment and income levels by Macro area. Wages are in Euros per
hour, employment rate in % of the 15-64 year olds. The employment rate is corrected for informal work as described in
section 3.5.3. The labor income per capita is constructed multiplying the average full-time monthly earnings (assuming
160 working hours per month) in Euros with the employment rate and thus the probability of being in employment. The
table also shows the average % changes across provinces between the actual value and the projected value of each variable.
The counterfactual in Scenario 1 reflects a reduction of wages by the percent difference in mean value-added to the most
productive provinces (in this case the median of the top 5 provinces in terms of value-added) and an employment rate equal
to the one in the most productive provinces in all provinces. Scenario 2 adjusts wages according to the relationship between
productivity and wages as it is in Germany as well as employment according to the relationship between productivity and
employment in Germany. Note that the wages and employment of the top 5 provinces remain unadjusted. Averages are
weighted by working age population.
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Table 3.14: Counterfactual Scenarios - Variant 3: Top 10 Provinces
South North Total
Average hourly wage: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 8.36 8.68 8.54
Scenario 1 6.93 -16.79 8.25 -4.98 7.66 -10.28
Scenario 2 7.37 -11.56 8.38 -3.46 7.93 -7.09
Employment rate: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 57.32 71.00 64.86
Scenario 1 71.34 26.94 71.82 1.24 71.61 12.78
Scenario 2 69.66 23.87 71.32 0.53 70.58 11.01
Monthly income per capita: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 766.63 986.68 887.89
Scenario 1 790.23 4.95 948.41 -3.82 877.40 0.11
Scenario 2 821.33 9.19 956.94 -2.94 896.06 2.50
Note: This table shows the counterfactual wage, employment and income levels by Macro area. Wages are in Euros per
hour, employment rate in % of the 15-64 year olds. The employment rate is corrected for informal work as described in
section 3.5.3. The labor income per capita is constructed multiplying the average full-time monthly earnings (assuming
160 working hours per month) in Euros with the employment rate and thus the probability of being in employment. The
table also shows the average % changes across provinces between the actual value and the projected value of each variable.
The counterfactual in Scenario 1 reflects a reduction of wages by the percent difference in GVA to the most productive
provinces and an employment rate equal to the one in the most productive provinces in all provinces. Scenario 2 adjusts
wages according to the relationship between productivity and wages as it is in Germany as well as employment according
to the relationship between productivity and employment in Germany. Averages are weighted by working age population.
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Table 3.15: Counterfactual Scenarios - Variant 4: Top 20 Provinces
South North Total
Average hourly wage: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 8.36 8.68 8.54
Scenario 1 7.02 -15.74 8.34 -3.99 7.75 -9.27
Scenario 2 7.42 -10.97 8.43 -2.95 7.97 -6.55
Employment rate: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 57.32 71.00 64.86
Scenario 1 70.53 25.44 70.94 -0.02 70.76 11.41
Scenario 2 69.00 22.65 70.60 -0.50 69.89 9.89
Monthly income per capita: Level Change % Level Change % Level Change %
Status quo 766.63 986.68 887.89
Scenario 1 791.41 5.11 946.83 -4.03 877.06 0.08
Scenario 2 819.10 8.89 952.57 -3.43 892.65 2.10
Note: This table shows the counterfactual wage, employment and income levels by Macro area. Wages are in Euros per
hour, employment rate in % of the 15-64 year olds. The employment rate is corrected for informal work as described in
section 3.5.3. The labor income per capita is constructed multiplying the average full-time monthly earnings (assuming
160 working hours per month) in Euros with the employment rate and thus the probability of being in employment. The
table also shows the average % changes across provinces between the actual value and the projected value of each variable.
The counterfactual in Scenario 1 reflects a reduction of wages by the percent difference in mean value-added to the most
productive provinces and an employment rate equal to the one in the most productive provinces in all provinces. Scenario
2 adjusts wages according to the relationship between productivity and wages as it is in Germany as well as employment
according to the relationship between productivity and employment in Germany. Averages are weighted by working age
population.
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Appendix: Figures
Figure 3.1: Model Equilibria
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Figure 3.2: Mean Value-Added per Worker
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Note: This figure plots deviations from country mean of the gross value-added per worker of a
local area in 2010. Means are not weighted by population.
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Figure 3.3: Nominal Wages
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Note: This figure plots deviations from country mean of the nominal wages in euros (corrected for
work force composition) in 2010. Means are not weighted by population.
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Figure 3.4: Nominal Wage and Value Added
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between log conditional nominal wages and log value-
added in 2010.
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Figure 3.5: Non-Employment Rate
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Note: This figure plots deviations from country mean of non-employment rate of the 15-64 year
olds in 2010.
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Figure 3.6: Non-Employment and Value Added
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between the log non-employment rate among the 15-64
year olds and log value-added across provinces in 2010.
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Figure 3.7: Non-Employment Rate - Corrected for Informal Work
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Note: To account for employment in the informal sector in Italy we compute an ”informal labour
market - corrected” employment rate by adjusting our employment rate to the fact that we only
observe proportion 1 − einf (1-rate of informal employment) of actual employment. We thus
inflate the official employment rate by a factor 1
1−einf . By computing real expected income on
the basis of this measure we implicitly assume that expected wages in the informal sector do not
differ from those in the formal sector. Map above expresses deviations from country mean of the
non-employment rate among the 15-64 year olds of a local area in the year 2010 - uncorrected and
corrected. Means are not weighted by population.
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Figure 3.8: Housing Costs
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Note: Deviations from country mean of the housing price index in 2010. Means are not weighted
by population.
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Figure 3.9: Local Cost of Living Indexes
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Note: Deviations from country mean of the consumer price index (as constructed by the method
described in section 3.4 in 2010. Means are not weighted by population.
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Figure 3.10: Real Wages
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Note: Deviations from country mean of the real wages in euros (nominal wages adjusted for
consumer prices) in 2010. Means are not weighted by population.
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Figure 3.11: Real Wage and Value Added
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Note: Scatter plots above show the relationship between log real wages and log value-added of
provinces in 2010.
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Figure 3.12: Nominal and Real Wages
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Note: Scatter plots above show the relationship of nominal and real wages across local areas in
the year 2010. It shows that in Germany there is a strong dispersion of nominal wages while
they are very compressed in Italy (same scale not possible because of hourly/daily wages). In
Germany the correlation between real and nominal wages is visible. In Italy southern real wages
differ considerably but they favour the south.
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Figure 3.13: Changes in Counterfactuals for Scenario 1
(a) Nominal wages
(.01,21]
(-.01,.01]
(-6.15,-.01]
(-10.37,-6.15]
(-16.64,-10.37]
[-34,-16.64]
(b) Employment
(31.7,58]
(18.4,31.7]
(11.87,18.4]
(.01,11.87]
[0,.01]
Note: This map shows the geographic dispersion of the percentage changes from status quo to
counterfactual wage and employment among the 15-64 year olds. The counterfactual in Scenario 1
reflects a reduction of wages by the percent difference in GVA to the median of the most productive
provinces (in this case all the Northern provinces) and an employment rate equal to the one in the
most productive of all provinces. The employment rate is corrected for informal work as described
in section 3.5.3. Note that wages and employment in the North are not adjusted.
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Figure 3.14: Changes in Counterfactuals for Scenario 2
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Note: This map shows the geographic dispersion of the percentage changes from status quo to
counterfactual wage and employment among the 15-64 year olds. Scenario 2 adjusts wages ac-
cording to the relationship between productivity and wages in Germany as well as employment
according to the relationship between productivity and employment in Germany. The employment
rate is corrected for informal work as described in section 3.5.3. Note that wages and employment
in the North are not adjusted.
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